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ROGER PEARSON
General Editor

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SDI: A CASE STUDY IN SOVIET NEGOTIATING STYLE

by Susanne Simmons

The INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) agreement signed by United States President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev (and still subject to ratification by the United States Senate) raises a number of serious issues involving Soviet negotiating strategy and particularly the role of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in U.S. defense policy.

On November 22, 1984, the United States and the Soviet Union resumed negotiations to reach mutually acceptable agreements on the full-scope of issues concerning nuclear and space arms.(1) The deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe had been the primary cause of the breakdown in 1983 in the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START).(2) Concern over the long-term implications of U.S. President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) – frequently referred to in the media as "Star Wars" – is said to have convinced the Soviet Union that it should return to the arms control negotiating table.(3)

The 1985 Geneva summit and the 1986 Reykjavik summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev did not end with agreements. It was not that both the Geneva talks between the superpower delegations and the summits were fruitless, or that there was total disharmony between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on all arms control issues. In fact, the 2½ years of negotiations brought the two countries closer together in working out a formula that would reduce the strategic nuclear offensive forces of both sides by 50% over a five-year period, and would reduce Soviet heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces. Both sides discussed a global limit for each side of 100 warheads on longer-range intermediate-range nuclear force (LRINF) missiles to be deployed in Soviet Asia and on U.S. territory.(4) The two sides were working out the final details of an INF accord that would include a virtual ban on all medium- and short-range missiles worldwide.(5)

The final agreement thus signed has met the Gorbachev purpose of radical cuts in long-range strategic arms, while preserving the ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile) treaty, the latter which pre-

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vents the sort of tests necessary for defensive systems. The final agreement led to a consensus on reducing total strategic ballistic missile warheads to 4,900 each. A tentative accord was reached on the principle of limiting the number of sea-based cruise missiles. However, in a written statement issued five hours after Reagan bid farewell to Gorbachev a critical discussion was revealed. The question of limiting the Strategic Defense Initiative was avoided. One issue which brought the breath-taking progress of the talks became the chief barrier to reaching an agreement: SDI.(6) SDI will be the topic of continued debate among arms control experts who argue about its technological feasibility, and the topic of debate among top U.S. officials who haggle over the question of whether or not it should be funded or compromised.

SDI makes an interesting case study in Soviet negotiating style. I will argue that throughout the past 2½ years of negotiations – at the Geneva talks and the two superpowers summits – the manner in which the Soviets have negotiated the issue of SDI has been consistent with past observations of their tendencies and tactics. True, the young, energetic Gorbachev has added a few dimensions to Soviet negotiating behavior; but neither he nor his top negotiators have developed a new style. I refer to the *Soviet style* as the embodiment of the following interrelated aspects. One, it entails certain historical and cultural factors that influence the way the Soviets view their overall position. Two, because of these influential factors, there are specific views the Soviets hold regarding the purpose of negotiations. Three, in light of these influences and views, the Soviets take a distinctive approach in actual negotiations. It is important to emphasize that the study of Soviet negotiating style is not for the sake of devising a strict set of guidelines or rules for U.S. negotiators to follow in their talks with the Soviets. Rather, such a study is valuable in the sense that it gives the U.S. government and its negotiators direction on what to expect from the Soviets based on past experiences. Hence, it is a tool to enhance U.S. negotiating strategy. My purpose will be to analyze Soviet negotiating style by using SDI as a case study. Before I proceed with the aforementioned, I will explain the essence of SDI, strategic defense in general, and the U.S. and Soviet positions on these technologies.

Strategic defense is defense against incoming ICBMs or their nuclear warheads. Both the Soviet Union and the U.S. have

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investigated strategic defense technologies. The Soviet Union does not provide a great deal of information on its progress on the research and development of strategic defense technologies and systems. In fact, although the Soviet negotiators talk about their strategic defense program "unofficially," at the Geneva talks they have *never* formally admitted that their country has such a program.(7) Nonetheless, it is known that the Soviets do have some elements of a modern strategic defense system.(8) With regard to the U.S., since 1983 the U.S. has been developing strategic defense technologies under its SDI program.(9) The Reagan administration is firmly committed to this endeavor. Its objective is "to seek a cooperative transition from an offense-dominant military structure in the world toward a defense-dominant structure."(10) Some of the possibilities with such a system are as follow:

* a system that would defend the entire country, both population and missile silos. (Several technologies show promise in this area, involving components in space and on the ground.)

* a point defense system, most notably of targets such as ICBM fields. (Such technology is probably the most attainable.)

* a combination of several technologies to form a system of many layers that would significantly lower the percentage of missiles that would get through.(11)

Defenders of SDI admit that a completely leak-proof system is probably unattainable. Thus, they stress deterrence more than defense, since any reasonably effective system can protect enough land-based missiles to make a Soviet first-strike unlikely. They argued that by removing the incentive for a first-strike, SDI would provide for a stable strategic balance. The Soviets are quite fearful of such an impact, for it has the potential to render impotent their heavy reliance on ground-based ICBMs.(12) Besides this strategic concern, there are other reasons why the Soviets have opposed President Reagan's SDI program from the time he unveiled the initiative in March of 1983. I will explain these concerns as I discuss Soviet negotiating style.

It is worth noting here that many of the strategic defense technologies being investigated now are based upon ideas and techniques that were being developed a decade ago or two ago. This is primarily because the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)

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Treaty did not prohibit research. Now this treaty is the area in which the two sides are engaged in a battle over what is permitted in the area of strategic defense.(13) The Soviet Union has consistently insisted, at Reykjavik for example, that the ABM Treaty should be strengthened. Its interpretation of the treaty calls for the restriction of testing of all space elements or components of anti-ballistic missile defense systems to the laboratory.(14) They, have made agreements in other areas – INF and START – contingent upon their demands for strengthening the ABM Treaty in an effort to outlaw SDI experiments. This has been an "on again . . . off again" tactic. The Reagan administration, however, argues that virtually everything short of actual deployment of an SDI system is permitted. The U.S. government, therefore, has justified several planned space experiments on the grounds that sub-components will be tested rather than actual ABM components, or that the tests will not take place in an ABM mode.(15) Furthermore, the U.S. government contends that the Soviet Union has violated limits on ABM components, such as the new large phased-array radars at Krasnoyarsk in Siberia.(16)

It is important to note that the treaty itself is somewhat fuzzy. It prohibits development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM "systems or components," and precludes testing of non ABM systems "in an ABM mode." Thus, it is not surprising that such terms have been subject to a wide range of definitions.(17) The way the Soviets' interpret the ABM Treaty is nothing new. It is, in fact, an integral part of their negotiating style.

Historical and Cultural Influences

The historical and cultural influences on how the Soviets perceive their position in the world are both numerous and complex. However, there are a particular few that greatly affect their negotiating style.

Historically, the Russians have been isolated, geographically and culturally, from the West since the Middle Ages. Western intellectual developments, such as the Renaissance and the Reformation, barely reached the Russian State.(18) As a result, when tentative contacts began in the 16th century between the Russians and the West, the Russians were quite fearful and envious of Western technology and culture.(19) The historical

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isolation and backwardness fostered a sense of inferiority, a strong need to be treated as equals, and a belief that weaknesses must be hidden.(20) This historical feeling was further reinforced when the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, with its attempt to use Marxism-Leninism to spread the international revolution throughout the world, further deterred many other powers from attempting friendly relations.

With regard to the superpower relationship, for years the Soviets were obsessed with catching up militarily with the U.S., and, if possible, to edge ahead. In consequence, Soviet forces, both nuclear and conventional, grew dramatically over a quarter of a century to the point where the Soviet leadership could be confident that parity had been secured at an extremely high level of armaments on both sides.(21) In the last decade, in particular, the Soviet self-image has, therefore, improved significantly in the military sphere. They indeed value their military prowess; it ensures their treatment as equals of the U.S. In the case of arms control negotiations, and especially strategic arms negotiations, the Soviets view the talks as a symbol of their superpower status and their military parity with the U.S. They therefore expect that position to be recognized and respected. In fact, they are quite sensitive to any statement or action that might imply Soviet inferiority.(22)

On March 23, 1983, when President Reagan announced his Strategic Defense Initiative, the Soviet fear of being overwhelmed by U.S. military technology was once again rekindled. True, as I previously mentioned, the Soviets have investigated and developed some SDI technologies. Nonetheless, their current technology is no match for that of the U.S. in critical areas that are essential for researching and developing an SDI-type program, such as computers and computer software.(23) Thus, the Soviets find themselves "stumbling in the terra incognita of high technology defenses."(24)

Another historical influence that has affected Soviet negotiations with the U.S. in arms control in general and SDI in particular, is its history of being invaded and invading neighboring lands themselves.(25) The experience of centuries of invasion by the Tartars, the Poles, the Swedes, the French, and the Germans has resulted in quite a defensive attitude to say the least.(26) In addition, this painful history has resulted in an obsession with security which has in turn induced an extreme habit of secrecy regarding defense matters.(27)

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In the case of SDI, there is a definite Soviet fear that the U.S. will use strategic defense to develop a first-strike capability; for it has the potential of destroying the few missiles the Soviets would have left with which to retaliate. As mentioned previously, the Soviet reliance on ground-based ICBMs would be obsolete.(28) Yegor Ligachev, Politiburo member and Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Secretariat, expressed these fears at a press conference held in Helsinki in 1986. He said:

> SDI is a sword rather than a shield. SDI is not a defensive program, but primarily one for developing qualitatively new types of strategic weapons based on new physical principles.(29)

Expressing a belligerent attitude toward the U.S. in light of these fears is Vladimir Petrosky, the Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said:

> The Americans think that through outerspace they could achieve military superiority over us and put into effect an idea of one of their Presidents who said: "Who rules in outerspace will rule on Earth." That shows that what we are dealing with here is imperial ambition.(30)

The Soviet history of invading neighboring lands has also affected the way the Soviets view their position. Historian Richard Pipes notes that early Moscow had established its sovereignty by conquering territory. Pipes argues that since "the Soviets, as did the Russians before them, 'consider the status of lands and peoples presently under their control entirely beyond discussion . . . [they] have nothing to lose and always something to gain from negotiations."(31) The Soviet view is compatible with "What's mine is mine, What's yours is negotiable"(32) For example, it would be expected that the Soviets would do everything possible to prevent the realization of SDI through other means precisely because they want to preserve the value of their offensive forces.(33)

Besides these historical influences, there are aspects of the Soviet political culture that has had an impact on the way they view their position. Most importantly is the oligarchical process for making decisions, specifically in the areas of defense and arms control. Not only are the major decisions decided upon at the top of the Soviet hierarchy – the Politburo primarily – but so are a great many of the details of the Soviet negotiating positions.(34) The collective character of the Soviet system also

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prevents or at least decreases the effect an individual personality can have in the negotiating process. This not only applies to the individual negotiators of a Soviet delegation at specific talks, but also applies to the Soviet leader in power.

Westerners must continue to observe the extent to which Mikhail Gorbachev is able to impose his fundamental views.(35) Indeed, he is young, energetic, and quite a Public Relations man. He has also been labeled a "radical reformer," one who seems eager to reduce the military's influence and cut military spending so that he can concentrate on the Soviet Union's dire economic conditions. True, the Soviet leader has made some impressive moves. He has consolidated his power rather quickly, and he has reduced the military's influence. One, however, should not be so naive as to assume that the military or conservative elites at the top of the Soviet hierarchy will go unnoticed. Gorbachev will be unable to simply ignore the pressure of not representing a position of weakness in dealing with the U.S. The military and conservative elites will continue to join forces, stressing the damaging effect a program like SDI would have on the Soviet military structure. Given this sense of hierarchy, it is not wise for one who rises to the top to simply do as he pleases; such a leader will not remain at the top very long – *Khrushchev made that mistake!* Thus, whatever the future holds, the lobbying, cajoling and threats from the military and conservatives will not make Gorbachev's job easy.(36)

The Purpose of Negotiations

In light of these historical and cultural influences, there is a distinctive Soviet view of the purpose of negotiations. Primarily, the Soviets view negotiations as a part of a broad effort to maximize their power and influence.(37) This is especially the case with arms limitation negotiations. True, all parties involved in negotiations seek to enhance their interests: they choose options regarding issues that will place their represented country in a more propitious position than had it not engaged in the negotiating process. However, the Soviets have a broader view. To explain, I will use scholar Igor Lukes' comparison between an American dictionary's and a contemporary Soviet dictionary's definition of the term *negotiation*. The former "states that negotiation is 'a diplomatic technique for the peaceful settlement of differences and the advancement of

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national interests. The objectives of negotiations are accomplished by compromise and accommodation reached through direct personal contact.'"(38) Professor Lukes points out that the nature of negotiation is often misunderstood. At times of crisis, the public finds it difficult to offer any concessions to the adversary. Nonetheless, "reaching agreement through negotiation implies willingness on both sides to make mutually acceptable concessions."(39) In comparison, the Soviet dictionary simply states that negotiation is "an exchange of options with a concrete goal."(40) Interesting – there is no mention of compromise, accommodation, or concession. This is not to imply that the Soviet and American negotiators refresh their memories with such definitions – *nor should they*. My point is simply that there is evidence to show that the Soviets and Americans have a different "concept" of negotiation. For the Soviets it *all* deals with their interests.

As far as these interests are concerned, the Soviets use negotiations to enhance their strategic position, their relationship with other countries, and their internal order. In addition, negotiations provide them with a valuable means to divide their opponents.(41) In fact, quite often, "the Soviets have not been as much concerned about concluding an agreement in negotiations as about using the process to promote their own interests."(42)

At the Geneva talks since 1985, and at the Geneva and Reyjkavik summits, *this* aspect of the *Soviet style* has been quite evident with regard to the issue of SDI. The reasons SDI is viewed as an issue of such overwhelming importance is due to the broad interests, both internal and external, the Soviets hope to advance and secure. Internally, SDI is an impediment on the radical economic reforms championed by Gorbachev and his cohorts. The fact that the superpowers would share and cooperate on strategic defense technologies – as President Reagan insists – is irrelevant. Such an endeavor would still demand a great deal of resources, including money and manpower. These resources, however, must be diverted to projects that will significantly enhance Soviet economic performance, such as those that offer a great availability of consumer goods and produce goods that can compete with Western products in world markets.

Besides the fact that a full-scale SDI program would entail expending resources on a new generation of sophisticated

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weapons technology, the results may not be as fruitful as anticipated. The technological feasibility of the program that President Reagan envisions is still relatively unknown. The Soviets, therefore, can ill-afford to bank on the failure of a full-scale SDI-type program.(43) Thus, the economy will continue to be a major constraint upon Soviet foreign policy in general. SDI, in particular, will continue to be a dominant concern and, as a result, will have a paramount effect on Soviet negotiating behavior.(44)

Another interest the Soviets hope to advance is quite an obvious one: their strategic security. I have, in fact, previously mentioned how SDI affects Soviet security. Some factors, however, need to be explained in more detail. The Soviets have made impressive investments in extremely capable strategic and theater nuclear systems in the last decade. These systems are designed to destroy the adversary's military-economic infrastructure; eliminate its strategic nuclear forces and other military forces in order to limit damage to the Soviet Union; and strengthen and extend Soviet military influence. Strategic defense, if deployed, as a direct threat to these systems and objectives would create significant military-strategic problems for the Soviet Union. Effective U.S. defense could deny the Soviet Union the ability to destroy a militarily significant portion of the targets to be attacked. This would require alternative methods to destroy U.S. nuclear systems and conduct operations against the territory of the U.S. and its allies.(45) Thus, there is merit in the Soviet military's and Gorbachev's fear of such a system. Maintaining strategic security is an interest to uphold in any arms negotiations.

There are external factors that the Soviets hope to advance as well. Primarily, they need improved relations with the Western world (Western Europe and Japan for example). This interest is extremely vital to the Soviet economic and strategic considerations. Economically, Gorbachev's "radical economic reforms" require a far more complete integration of the Soviet economy into the world economy.(46) Strategically improved relations with West European nations could also convince them to put pressure on President Reagan to make concessions on SDI. A prerequisite for such improved relations, however, is a definite need to change the "big bad bear image."

The issues concerning arms limitations have indeed presented Gorbachev with a few dilemmas in his effort to win better

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relations with West Europe and Japan. On the one hand, many Western European leaders – though not all – welcome an INF treaty and a more harmonious East/West relationship. On the other hand, linking INF with SDI is thought to be a way to extract concessions from the U.S. Although the Soviets are strongly opposed to SDI while the U.S. is deeply committed to it, the Soviets want the dialogue to continue. President Reagan, keen to continue the dialogue, eagerly signed the INF treaty. Given the fact that the Soviet Union pays closer attention to the 1988 presidential candidates than do Americans, they are well aware of the fact that *all* the Republican candidates are also committed to SDI. The Soviets are also well aware of the fact that some of these candidates would not be so eager to maintain the U.S./Soviet dialogue for the sake of SDI. Thus, the Soviets' interest in maintaining some semblance of a positive dialogue with the U.S. might best be served under President Reagan.

Unlike many U.S. policy makers, the Soviet leaders take a long-term view of these factors. They are always looking to enhance their long-term interests. Gorbachev, especially, has a long-term perspective. After all, he hopes to stay in power for quite some time. Many Western observers look favorably upon him. His *glasnost*, moderacy, and "radical economic reforms," are favorable to a more harmonious U.S./Soviet relationship. Granted, Gorbachev is not a Stalin, but he did not make it to the top of the Soviet hierarchy by being "Mr. Nice Guy." Furthermore, his behavior and that of his negotiators throughout these past 2½ years does not give any observer evidence that the Soviets have changed their personality for the better. In fact, such observers should, instead, note the similarities with their present approach to that of past negotiations.

The Soviet Approach

Firstly, throughout the nuclear and space negotiations, the Soviets have primarily based their opposition to SDI on the argument that it violates the 1972 ABM Treaty. This was a very generally-worded agreement, the ambiguity of which is now being exploited to their advantage. Secondly, the Soviets have place the real burden of compromise on the U.S. by linking offensive and defensive limitations. These two approaches are nothing new. In fact, the U.S. should have been expecting these

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actions; for they are indeed integral parts of the overall Soviet negotiating style. The Soviets have consistently preferred generally-worded agreements: "This inclination derives in part from the numerous instances, particularly in early Soviet history, when negotiations were used to cover or compensate for weakness. The Soviets found that, if an agreement was formulated in general terms, they could later adhere to it only in the most advantageous manner."(47)

Specifically with the ABM Treaty, *now* is the *later*. Gorbachev's emphasis on this treaty allows the fight against SDI to continue within the framework of an already existing treaty that has widespread popular support.(48) In addition, the general wording of this treaty gives him room to interpret it to the Soviet advantage. In his proposal to Reagan at Reykjavik, "testing of all space elements of anti-ballistic defense in space [is] prohibited except research and testing in laboratories."(49) The Reagan administration, however, interprets the treaty quite differently. It has suggested that the treaty permits virtually everything other than actual deployment.(50) This interpretation was later modified in favor of a more restrictive interpretation. The U.S. government, nonetheless, does not adhere to the Soviet interpretation, contending that a demand to limit SDI to laboratory work goes well beyond the structures embedded in the treaty, and such a constraint would be unverifiable.(51) The Soviets, furthermore, hold that if the ABM Treaty were cancelled, it would reduce the chance of ever achieving mutually acceptable agreements on the limitation or reduction of their offensive forces.(52)

With regard to the Soviet approach of putting the burden of compromise on the U.S., there is an historical correlation that relates to its deep-seated inferiority complex. This complex has given rise to a Soviet view that compromise is a sign of weakness.(53) The word *Kompromise* is not even a native Russian word, but a word acquired from other languages.(54) This is not to imply that the Soviets never make concessions or trade-offs. It is simply to note that they do so "grudgingly and deliberately, using all pressures at their disposal as much as possible from the other side."(55) Besides, in yielding points, they often "resort to a tactic of dramatizing their concessions."(56) Quite often, in fact, such points should not have been held back in the first place or at least for "so long a time."(57) Furthermore, the Soviets feel the need to keep an

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even score-card of concessions made. For example, "They might say, 'We made five concessions; you're only made four. Why aren't you willing to keep up with us?'"(58)

In the Geneva talks and the two superpower summits, these tactics have been quite obvious. The Soviets expect the U.S. to compromise on SDI, and they consistently dramatize the concessions they have made. With regard to the latter, it is interesting to point out some of the comments made by top Soviet officials. I again refer to Yegor Ligachev, Politburo member and Secretary of the CPSU Secretariat, in his November 1986 Helsinki press conference. He said:

> I would like to stress most emphatically that the progress in Reykjavik was achieved thanks to the bold initiatives of the Soviet Union and on the basis of the proposals. When we put these proposals forward, we made a number of serious concessions and compromises .... In the United States, they now claim that the Soviet Union is intractable and wants to make the United States drop the Strategic Defense Initiative altogether .... Yet, we agreed to continued laboratory research into SDI. It is a serious concession. This is, however, being laboriously hushed up in the United States.(59)

Some gesture! Even the most ardent opponents of SDI admit that restricting SDI to the laboratory is ridiculous. Besides this, in the same press conference, there was not a word mentioned about the conessions the U.S. made at Reykjavik in an effort to address some of the Soviet interests. For example, Mr. Ligachev did not say anything about President Reagan's attempt to address Gorbachev's concern that the SDI program was a shield behind which the U.S. could launch a successful first-strike because there would be no ballistic missiles with which to strike first.(60)

Also making some rather interesting remarks concerning "Soviet concessions" is Vladimir Petrovsky, Soviet Deputy Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At a United Nations address, he commented on the Soviet proposal at Reykjavik on medium-range missiles in Europe. He stated:

> The Soviet side made serious changes in its position, taking primarily into account the interests of the European states in arriving at a solution to this problem now. It left aside the French and British nuclear capabilities, although those two countries, both allies of the United

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> States, have a nuclear potential that continues to be built up and improved, ... Even that obstacle, therefore, was also removed by the efforts of the Soviet side and at the cost of major concessions on our part.(61)

This, indeed, was a concession. However, the British and French forces never posed a threat to parity – only the new U.S. missiles did.(62) Therefore, the Soviets should have yielded this point some time ago.

There are other interesting examples that demonstrate the extent to which the negotiations of SDI serve as a case study in Soviet negotiating style. Of course, there are examples which demonstrate otherwise. Such examples are, I think, " exceptions to the rule." In fact, I will argue that the only semblances of real ingenuity in the Soviet style are Gorbachev's "flip-flop" tactic (linking and unlinking SDI to other agreements), and his extraordinary public relations campaign throughout the West. The former, however, is primarily due to the conflicting internal and external interests he hopes to advance that I previously discussed. With regard to the latter, it is actually only a means to an end: a way to put pressure on the U.S. to concede on SDI. In fact, this tactic has been used before; it is just that young, cosmopolitan Gorbachev has used it effectively. For example, his "Star Peace" campaign is an attempt to influence the U.S. public, Congress, and scientific community; the public and governments of U.S. allies; and the neutral and non-aligned states. This proposal ostensibly offers international space cooperation as an alternative to the destabilizing search for a disarming first-strike capability and nuclear superiority that the Soviets claim is the objective of the "sinister plans of Star Wars."(63) Gorbachev spoke on this theme in his January 1986 disarmament proposals, declaring that among other things:

> We are against weapons in space. Our material and intellectual capabilities make it possible for the Soviet Union to develop any weapon if we are compelled to do so. But we are fully aware of our responsibility to the present and future generations. It is our profound conviction that we should approach the third millenium not with the Star Wars program, but with the large-scale projects of peaceful space exploration by all mankind."(64)

This theme will continue to be stressed, and the Soviets will continue to exploit negotiations on controlling space

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weaponry for propaganda purposes. The hope, of course, is to fulfill the Soviet objective of destroying SDI and improving its international relations. As George F. Will has stressed:

> Does the president understand why the Soviets are saying SDI is a deferrable problem? They recognize the slow strangulation of a complex collaborative scientific enterprise. Strangulation is the result of three factors.
>
> One is Reagan's acquiescence in a "temporary" (seven to 10 years — the number hardly matters) undertaking not to exercise the right to withdraw from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. The second is Congress' determination to enforce a narrow interpretation of what that treaty allows in the way of testing defensive weapons. The third is the Reagan deficit.
>
> Nothing is more permanent than a "temporary" arms-control arrangement. Any deviation would be denounced as contrary to the "spirit of the arms-control "process." The narrrow interpretation is, therefore, forever and will prevent the sort of tests necessary to prove strategic defense feasible. In the context of permanent fiscal constraint, Congress will inflict on strategic defense an anemia that will drive scientists to other projects that are not permanently in the subjuctive sense.(65)

Conclusion

To conclude this article, I would like to reiterate a few points and make some general observations. The Soviet negotiating style embodies certain historical and cultural influences that affect the Soviet view on the purpose of negotiations and the manner in which they negotiate. Some of the most noteworthy aspects of the *Soviet style* are their effort to maximize a broad array of interests, their preference for generally-worded agreements, and their view that compromise is a sign of weakness.

I have used SDI as a case study in Soviet negotiating style. I recognize the fact that just as the Soviets attempt to achieve their national and strategic interests, so do the Americans: SDI, under this administration, is an integral part of U.S. interests. Rather, my objective dealt with observing Soviet negotiating style in arms limitation negotiations with the U.S. The study of Soviet negotiating style not only provides U.S. negotiators with vital information of what to expect in actual negotiations, but

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such a study can improve their position in future negotiations by learning from past mistakes. After all, the Soviets have pulled off a "bait-and-switch scheme" at Reagan's expense before.(66) There are a few points that the U.S. should always remember when negotiating with the Soviet Union.

Overall, the United States should negotiate willingly in the hope that negotiations may mitigate competition or the threat of open conflict with the Soviet Union.(67) However, it is a mistake to support an arms control agreement as desirable in itself, and believe that any agreement is better than none.(68) An agreement *must* be verifiable, clear, and detailed. More especially, national and strategic interests cannot be sacrificed under the impressions one is taking advantage of a more moderate Gorbachev. Before any decision is made regarding an agreement with the Soviets in arms limitations, the U.S. officials and negotiators should always remember the great words of Winston Churchill spoken long ago. He said:

> I cannot forecast to you the actions of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.(69)

The situation is perceptively summed up by an editorial in *The Wall Street Journal*:

> The hoopla surrounding the signing of this latest treaty conceals a hard fact: The entire Washington community, from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other, of late has suffered a fundamental loss of seriousness about the direction and purpose of Western security. We suspect that many in Washington, Democrats and Republicans, know this to be so. Will any of them soon begin redefining an agenda that forces the West to work on its defense, instead of mostly talking about it?
>
> Arms control, we fear, has become the heavy-metal music of Western foreign policy — a seemingly addictive pursuit of otherwise normal people. There seems to be a difference, though, at least so far. After a heavy-metal concert, the audience goes back to the real world.(70)

FOOTNOTES

(1) Maaranen, p. 51.

(2) Leon Sloss, "Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviet Union: Introduction nad Findings," in *A Game for High Stakes*, p. 1.

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(3) Freedman, p. 131.
(4) Ridgway, p. 11.
(5) Kohan, p. 57.
(6) Norman, p. 534.
(7) Spotts, p. 1.
(8) Jasani, p. 28.
(9) Ibid., p. 29.
(10) Kampelman, p. 24.
(11) Perez, p. 21.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Jasani, p. 35.
(14) Ibid.
(15) Norman, p. 533.
(16) Adelman, pp. 39-40.
(17) Norman, p. 533.
(18) Sloss and Davis, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation," in *National Negotiating Styles*, p. 18.
(19) Ibid., p. 19.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Lyne, p. 221.
(22) Leon Sloss, "Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviet Union: Introduction and Finding," in *A Game for High Stakes*, p. 7.
(23) Perez, p. 22.
(24) Stengel, p. 39.
(25) Sloss and Davis, "The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation," in *National Negotiating Styles*, pp. 17-18.
(26) Edward L. Rowney, "Ten Commandments for Negotiating with the Soviet Union," in *A Game for High Stakes*, p. 51.
(27) Sloss and Davis, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation," in *National Negotiating Styles*, p. 18.
(28) Perez, pp. 21-22; 24.
(29) Goure', p. 82.
(30) Petrovsky, p. 22.
(31) Richard Pipes, "International Negotiation: Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy," quoted in "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation," in *National Negotiating Styles*, p. 19.
(32) Quoted in Sloss and Davis's, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation," in *National Negotiating Styles*, p. 19.
(33) Pilat, p. 139.
(34) Sloss and Davis, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation," *National Negotiating Styles*, pp. 21-23.
(35) Ibid.
(36) Rice, p. 343.
(37) Slos and Davis, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation," in *National Negotiating Styles*, p. 24.
(38) Lukes, p. 176.
(39) Ibid.
(40) Ibid.
(41) Sloss and Davis, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation," *National Negotiating Styles*, p. 24.
(42) Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "Soviet Negotiating Concept and Style," quoted in *A Game for High Stakes*, p. 24.
(43) Lyne, p. 223.
(44) Ibid., p. 222.
(45) Pilat, p. 139.

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(46) Hough, p. 346.
(47) Sloss and Davis, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation," *National Negotiating Styles*, p. 25.
(48) Hough, p. 345.
(49) Quoted in Norman, p. 534.
(50) Freedman, p. 137.
(51) Norman, p. 533.
(52) Pilat, p. 147.
(53) Sloss and Davis, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiations," in *National Negotiating Styles*, p. 24.
(54) Edward L. Rowny, "Ten Commandments for Negotiating with the Soviet Union," in *A Game for High Stakes*, p. 47.
(55) Sloss and Davis, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation," in *National Negotiating Styles*, p. 33.
(56) Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "Soviet Negotiating Concepts and Style," in *A Game for High Stakes*, p. 25.
(57) Ibid.
(58) Sidney Graybeal, "Soviet Negotiating Practice," in *A Game for High Stakes*, p. 39.
(59) Goure', p. 82.
(60) Maaranen, p. 4.
(61) Petrovsky, p. 20.
(62) Freedman, p. 139.
(63) Pilat, p. 146.
(64) Ibid.
(65) George F. Will "Gorbachev Is a Disarming Fellow,'" *The Washington Post*, December 9, 1987, p. A21.
(66) Kohan, p. 56.
(67) Sloss and Davis, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation," in *National Negotiating Styles*, p. 40.
(68) Nixon, p. 4.
(69) Greenberg, p. 1.
(70) "Heavy-Metal Treaty," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 9, 1987, p. 38. p. 38.

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

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NATO CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

By Robert C. Richardson, III

The June 1987 issue of the *NATO Review* carried an interesting article by Senator Sam Nunn in which he suggested a three-track approach to correcting any weaknesses in the defenses of NATO that might come about as a result of the approval of the proposed arms control treaties eliminating short and medium range missiles in Europe. The Senator's solution to perpetuating deterrence and defense in the new missile free environment called for: "revolutionary conventional force improvements; bold and innovative conventional arms proposals and; vigorous public education, including clear explanations of our military needs and our arms control rationale."

Senator Nunn argued, in support of his four proposals, that there have been four major shortcomings or "Horsemen of the Apocalypse" in NATO's defenses and that these need to be "corralled" since they pose a threat to NATO's strategy of Flexible Response. He listed these as being: 1) critical deficiencies in the conventional warfighting posture, 2) a tendency to get less and less equipment for ever more money which he refers to as "structural disarmament," 3) inadequate strategies for applying innovative technologies at the conventional level, and 4) missed opportunities in conventional arms control.

Obviously these shortcomings exist. With the possible exception of not adequately exploiting innovative technologies to bolster the conventional defenses, they have been recognized as deficiencies almost since the beginning of the Alliance. This raises the question of whether or not their correction is beyond our control and if so how this might effect the validity of the three track approach that he is proposing as a solution to NATO's security in a zero/zero nuclear missile environment?

Linkage

As one who has been intimately associated with both NATO and U.S. strategic planning for many years, I suggest that any changes in the scope and nature of the balance of forces in Europe – such as zeroing out offensive nuclear missiles – must be linked with their impact on: 1) the role played by the

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global strategic nuclear balance versus that of NATO's forces in Europe in terms of providing credible deterrence, or a valid defense should deterrence ever fail, 2) the military validity of "Flexible Response" as an effective war fighting strategy in the resulting new balance, and 3) the possible need to substitute or add new types of forces or other defensive capabilities in addition to merely building up the conventional forces.

There has been a tendency to forget that the U.S. commitment to use "any and all forces, if necessary" to defend NATO nations has always included not just NATO nuclear forces but also U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

Obviously any use of NATO nuclear forces would involve a very high likelihood of escalation to a strategic nuclear exchange. This likelihood has, in the past, been the major factor in deterrence of conventional Soviet aggression in Europe. So long as the Soviets could not risk escalation without risking their own annihilation, and could not reasonably count upon the U.S. and NATO accepting defeat in Europe rather than escalating to tactical and, if necessary, strategic nuclear response they dared not initiate a conventional attack against NATO.

This heretofore successful formula for deterrence of aggression in Europe could change should:

> The Soviets be permitted to acquire a first strike strategic capability sufficient to prevent the U.S. from being able to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation for global or limited acts of aggression that threatened U.S. vital interests.
>
> NATO in Europe loses its credible means of escalating to a nuclear response with theater weapons if and when its conventional forces are unable to prevent a Soviet advance into Europe or,
>
> Any combination of the above come about which would create a situation in which either NATO was deterred from resorting to its nuclear weapons or the U.S. was deterred from committing its strategic capabilities to the defense of Europe.

The first condition could arise should the build up of Soviet offensive missiles continue to the point where they had a first strike capability and we had not substituted effective defenses against them.

The second condition could occur if the tactical nuclear capabilities left in Europe posed no real threat to vital Soviet

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assets or Warsaw Pact territories or, if used, would be more than offset by Soviet theater missile capabilities.

The third condition could arise if a combination of the first two conditions made use of U.S. strategic and/or tactical nuclear capabilities militarily useless or essentially suicidal, e.g.: Inevitable Soviet retaliation would destroy the U.S., or resort to theater weapons would devastate only NATO territory (by virtue of their limited range) and do little or nothing to arrest the Soviet invasion.

Thus a failure to couple missile reductions in Europe with measures in the strategic defense arena such as SDI could destroy the existing deterrent to limited aggression by weakening NATO's ability to respond with nuclear weapons, if necessary, while concurrently allowing the Soviet build up to reduce the credibility of the U.S. commitment to use strategic forces for the defense of the Alliance. The INF Treaty could therefore degrade the Free World deterrent to Soviet aggression unless other measures are taken to offset these actions.

NATO Strategy

Two flaws have always existed with regards the defensive value and credibility of the strategy of Flexible Response. The first is the open ended nature of the conventional defenses this strategy presumes to be feasible. The second flaw lies in the fundamental incompatibility of the force postures required to wage conventional versus nuclear warfare.

A sustained major conventional war of attrition is an impossibility given the high unit costs and limited quantities to today's weapon systems. The key word here is sustained. A conventional build up can only buy more time before having to make the decision to go nuclear or accept defeat. It will not improve the prospects of defeating Soviet conventional aggression unless NATO were able and willing to match or exceed Warsaw Pact conventional capabilities. This, given the cost and complexity of modern weapons, is simply not possible especially in terms of the replacements and stockpiles necessary to sustain NATO forces in combat as long, or longer than, the Soviets can sustain their conventional forces.

Even if it were claimed that NATO could afford to match Soviet conventional capabilities in a sustained war of attrition one would still have to assume that the Soviets would accept

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conventional defeat rather than escalate to nuclear warfare themselves and that our European Allies would accept a concept under which America would fight for Europe in Europe without risking involvement at home as in WWII!

Since escalation to nuclear weapons has effectively deterred Soviet conventional aggression to date regardless of the conventional balance, and since no amount of conventional build up can hope to change the role of escalation in sustaining deterrence, the obvious question that arises out of any rational analysis of the cost and feasibility of achieving conventional force deterrence of Soviet conventional aggression is why spend why the required billions to do this merely to add a few days or weeks to the conventional phase?

We also need to answer the question of why the Soviets would be willing to accept conventional defeat rather than escalate themselves? This would seem to be a highly unlikely decision especially in a situation in which it was clearly to the West's disadvantage (suicidal) to respond by escalating to global nuclear warfare.

Even if it were acceptable to fight for Europe only in Europe the side that initiates nuclear fire in an environment of classic conventional force concentrations and deployments has near decisive advantage. The risk that SACEUR might resort to using his offensive missiles in a losing situation therefore makes it desirable to the Soviets to reduce this threat before risking conventional aggression. Obviously this threat is further reduced if the missiles available to SACEUR can only engage Soviet forces already in Allied territories as would be the case if NATO gave up all its medium range missiles.

Given the physical inability of NATO to decisively exploit the advantage of first use with NATO nuclear assets, the Alliance could still resort to strategic or other national nuclear capabilities to meet its NATO commitment. But, as stated above, the credibility of our doing this, hence its deterrent potential against conventional aggression, will then depend on the likely outcome of such actions which in turn depends upo the strategic balance at the time. This is why the acceptance of a zero option in INF forces cannot be divorced from strategic balance considerations nor merely offset by affordable levels of conventional improvements.

A lack of institutional memory all too often causes defense planners to accept past decisions as if they were written in

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stone. They then seek to solve all new security problems without modifying or changing existing types of forces, strategies, organizations, assigned roles and missions, doctrines, or customs or policies that are currently in effect. When this tendency is followed it basically leaves the planners only military hardware, and force levels to readjust in response to any changes in the overall threat. It is always easier to increase forces, spend more money, buy higher performance weapons, or invest in one more try at arms control, than it is to change strategy – when events invalidate those strategies we thought permanent!

This is sometimes referred to as "losing sight of the objective and redoubling the effort." We are now seeing a variant of this in the U.S. strategic arena in the massive efforts to perpetuate the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), and the ABM treaty, regardless of the shift that has taken place in the strategic balance in favor of the Soviets and the resulting loss in the credibility of our will and capability to retaliate in the defense of Europe in this new environment.

Reviewing Fundamentals

The "bottom line" for both global strategic and NATO strategy remain to deter aggression. If deterrence succeeds, all types and levels of forces and defense activities are academic. If deterrence fails and war ensues we must assume that both sides will use any and all means available to them to avoid defeat if not achieve outright victory. It is hard to conceive of any nation accepting defeat in a major war in preference to resorting to weapons or means which if used would offer them a good prospect for survival and possibly victory.

At present, as Senator Nunn points out, SACEUR would likely have to accept defeat or resort to nuclear weapons in "days not weeks or months." This was an accebtale situation when the U.S. enjoyed overall strategic nuclear superiority and therefore could reasonably assume that escalation, whatever its devastating effects, would tilt the eventual outcome in our favor.

On the other hand if one assumes U.S. strategic nuclear inferiority and as such U.S. and/or NATO vulnerability to defeat by a Soviet First Strike, or even if we assume rough strategic nuclear equivalence, the advantages of buying time by a massive and costly investment in improved conventional

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forces is far less clear. Maybe a case can still be made for these, but I have not yet seen it. If it can't be made, then the priority NATO goal must be to counter the Soviet first strike threat, both to the U.S. and NATO. This means coping with the shifting strategic balance by building SDI defenses before we invest in increased conventional forces.

President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is designed to cope with the shifting balance of offensive forces without having to invest in the MAD arms race that would be required to keep up with the Soviet build-up. NATO's extended Air Defense plans are designed to prevent a Soviet First Strike in Europe. By implementing both these programs as a prerequisite to accepting an INF zero/zero option we could also guard against possible cheating by the Soviets or a disarming Soviet first strike against NATO in Europe using missiles launched from sites east of the Urals. This will re-establish a credible strategic balance, and with it sustained deterrence of conventional aggression regardless of the conventional balance as in the past.

The problem with aspirations to avoid or delay resort to nuclear firepower is the fact that for all practical purposes the West has priced itself out of the ability to sustain a classic conventional war of attrition. No one likes to admit this but the cost effectiveness, complexity, and procurement lead time for most of today's major weapon systems make it impossible to accept even a minimal loss rate in combat for any length of time. This precludes going through the fall back, mobilization, build-up of decisive mass, and counter offensive phases inherent in classic responses to conventional aggressors.

The unpopular truth is that had atomic firepower never been invented no nation would have acquired weapon systems whose cost and complexity was incompatible with the quantities and replacement rates needed to deliver conventional firepower on a sustained basis. While the advent of smart bombs and other munitions are reducing quantities required for conventional destruction somewhat they are yet a long way from providing the cost/quantity delivery capability obtainable when carrying atomic munitions — let alone the area effects which in turn substitute for inaccuracies hence mass in delivery system requirements.

What this means in oversimplified terms is that the acceptance of ever-higher performance and costly systems over the

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years, subconsciously rationalized by the fact that they will be cost effective with atomic munitions, now dictates short wars whose outcome will be largely decided by forces in being at the onset. This has been accepted since the early 1950s as a fact of life in the strategic arena. Small conflicts whose outcome will not decisively effect national survival, or conflicts wherein the loss rates can be controlled unilaterally by the tempo of operations, as was the case in Viet Nam, will continue to justify the maintenance of sizable conventional forces.

Since neither of these criteria apply to a battle for Europe, but political aspirations still include dreams of being able to keep such a battle non nuclear even though military logic dictates that it would, and should, be nuclear from the onset – as recognized in the NATO 1956 Political Directive – the strategy of Flexible Response wound up as the compromise.

Common sense, technological progress, and cost considerations now suggest that the Flexible Response compromise should be re-examined. A good time to start this could be in connection with NATO strategy adjustments likely to be imposed by the adoption of the zero/zero arms control agreements along with proposals for conventional force agreements as suggested by Senator Nunn. Nothing will ever last forever, and that goes for strategies like both MAD and Flexible Response. Attempts to conduct or even deter new wars with the strategies, doctrines, and force concepts found successful in the last war have historically led to defeats and disasters.

For whatever combination of reasons major acts of Soviet aggression have been deterred effectively since WW II. Some attribute this primarily to U.S. strategic nuclear superiority. Most credit the Free World's ability, to date, to inflict unacceptable damage to the USSR in retaliation. No one attributes successful deterrence to superior NATO conventional defense capabilities.

Today our ability to retaliate effectively in response to a Soviet First Strike against the U.S. is becoming less and less credible. This is the direct result of the continued Soviet build-up in strategic missiles and submarines and improvements in related technologies such as accuracies and multiple warheads.

In the response to this trend, and to the demonstrated unwillingless of the U.S. Congress to fund the milti-billion dollar nuclear missile build up and passive defense program deemed essential to maintain a credible ability to retaliate, President

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Reagan proposed a change of strategy in 1983 based on a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). At the beginning of his 1983 speech suggesting this he said:

> "The strategy of deterrence has not changed. It still works. But what it takes to maintain deterrence has changed. It took one kind of military force to deter an attack when we had far more nuclear weapons than any other power — it takes another kind now that the Soviets, for example, have enough accurate and powerful nuclear weapons to destroy virtually all our missiles on the ground.

Regardless of the merits of SDI per se, or of the effectiveness of the early generation space and missile defense systems it might spawn, its basic purpose is to re-establish a credible deterrent by making first strikes against the U.S. or NATO too risky. In addition it can provide protection should deterrence fail or against accidental or "rogue" missile launchings.

Protecting the nations and the people, as best we can, is a basic and historic responsibility of government that has been deliberately ignored under the MAD strategy. The Soviets are providing such protection with their civil defense efforts and their own SDI programs and the West should do so now that technological progress makes such defenses cost effective if not perfect.

In this respect I share Senator Nunn's third measure, or track, to wit: "virgorous public education, including clear explanations of our military needs and our arms control rational." The SDI debate in the U.S. during the past few years has clearly demonstrated that the American public did not, on the average, understand that under the ABM Treaty it was being deliberately exposed to maximum losses and casualties even to accidental missile launches, let alone in war. 65% of those polled believed that their government was doing the best it could to protect them and most polls indicate a majority of 70% or more support the President's SDI plan and expect the government to protect them.

Based upon the SDI public education experience there would seem to be a good chance that the clear explanations and rationales proposed by Senator Nunn would logically lead to public support for deterrence and defenses based primarily upon the ability to defeat aggression rather than revenge it. It would also lead to and public rejection of any arms control deals that either exposed the people unnecessarily to maximum

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casualties in the event of wars or accidents or to risking their freedom and security on unverifiable trust in Soviet intentions.

In brief, I suggest that the way NATO should deal with the zero/zero option proposals is to pursue these, but link them unilaterally with a declared intent to re-establish a credible strategic balance, independent of the Soviet build-up, by deploying missiles defenses in Europe and in the U.S. in conjunction with eliminating the offensive systems by treaty. This would not only restore the strategic balance as the ultimate deterrent of Soviet conventional aggression limited to Europe for the reasons previously discussed, but also ensure that the Soviets could not use longer range missiles, in lieu of INF, in a first strike against Europe. In the resulting defense environment the U.S. commitment to NATO would remain credible as in the past and any need to build up conventional capabilities would be based primarily upon political decisions with respect to their cost versus the time them would buy prior to the need to escalate.

If SDI can deny the Soviets the ability to deter our resort to nuclear firepower in a losing situation in Europe by virtue of making escalation too risky for them it should re-establish the deterrent against local aggression previously by-product of U.S. strategic nuclear offensive superiority. In other words if a Soviet First Strike against the U.S., in response to SACEUR's resort to nuclear firepower, cannot preclude unacceptable damage to the USSR in retaliation, the Soviets are not likely to risk a local conventional invasion of Europe no matter what the INF, SRINF, or conventional balance may be. Given clear recognition of this linkage between the role of strategic and European based forces in deterrence and defense, any reductions in short range, medium range, or even long range missiles that can be negotiated will only improve security and reduce its costs.

Conversely, reductions in offensive missiles of any type without measures to restore the credibility of strategic participation, if necessary, in the defense of Europe will detract from the overall security of the Free World and reduce the risks to the Soviets of limited conventional aggression regardless of any build up of NATO conventional forces.

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BY

H. MUNRO CHADWICK,
Fellow of Clare College, Cambridge

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THE PRC OCCUPATION OF TIBET

By Julian Weiss

As the international wire services carried the story of Beijing's preparations for the commemoration of Mao Zedong's victorious conquest of China on October 1, 1949, thousands of miles from Beijing a group of monks and other civilians in Tibet were suffering beatings and even death for protesting the lack of freedom in their homeland while Beijing's onslaught against the Republic of Korea demonstrated similar desings on foreign territory. An almost forgotten land now incorporated into the far western reaches of the Chinese Communist empire, Tibet is evidence that Deng's new policy of 'liberalization,' comprising changes designed to strengthen the Chinese economy, does not differ in its ultimate expansionist objectives from the goals of Mao Zedong, who accomplished the invasion and subjugation of Tibet. The outcome made the PRC's goals closer to all but the dacre of Mao supporters who remained entrenched in the media, key U.S. government agencies, and in academia. The story of Tibet's relations with China, of its invasion by the Communist Chinese armies, and the recent Tibetan revolt against the PRC oppression is relevant to the current debate over the direction of China's foreign policy and its a attempted incorporation of yet further areas into its broad empire. Just as it claimed hegemony over Tibet, Beijing has claimed Hong Kong, Macao, and the Republic of China on Taiwan to be as parts of an ever-expanding empire under Beijing.

Tibet is a land of mystery as well as a geographic anomaly. The area embracing Tibet is a sequestered plain. Much of its windswept land lies at 16,000 feet, with mountain ranges rising to 20,000 feet surrounding these central uplands. Its capital, Lhasa, also known as 'The Forbidden City,' stands at 12,000 feet, and is the highest capital in the world. The overall altitude of Tibet, almost three miles high in the sky, led it to be described by Victorian visitors as 'The Roof in the Sky.' Geographically, the land represents a natural fortress situated in the very center of Asia.(1)

This unique area, ruled for centuries by a god-king (the Dalai Lama), was long known for its inaccessibility. The medieval

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European and Arab travelers who traversed the Asian caravan routes heard stories about Tibet but never ventured there. During the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911), China succeeded in establishing title to Tibet around 1760, but its isolation and its ability to synthesize various cultures (including influences from China, India, West Asia, and even Mongolia) allowed Tibet to preserve its own distinctive culture, complete with its own calendar, alphabet, religion, religious art, and architecture. The Lamaist religion originated from a form of Buddhism with the Dalai Lama being both the religious and the temporal ruler of Tibet.(2)

Tibet subsequently became an issue when the expansion of Czarist Russia into Central Asia, and of British influence in India, brought these powers to its borders. China asserted its claim to suzerainty over Tibet in 1906, and an Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 provided for the mutual abstention of these two powers from Tibet, without recognizing any claim from China. When the Chinese court sent an army into Tibet in 1910, the Dalai Lama fled to India. The next year the 1911 revolution in China overthrew the 3,000 year old imperial system, and the new government of China under Yuan Shih-k'ai claimed Mongolia and Tibet but lacked the political and military power to enforce that claim. Aided by the vast size and remoteness of their country, the Tibetans successfully expelled the Chinese troops from western and central Tibet, and the Dalai Lama declared Tibet an independent country in 1913 — a claim Britain recognized in 1914, but which China refused to recognize. China consequently continued to exercise administrative power over eastern or 'Inner' Tibet while 'Outer' Tibet, principally the central and western areas, developed independent relations with Britain and India. While British suzerainty was never asserted, both the Republic of China as well as the Communist People's Republic of China claimed Tibet as part of their territory.(3)

Immediately following his success on the mainland of China, Mao sought to consolidate his control over China internally, and also moved to use his army, fresh from victory, to seize all corners of the former Chinese territory. The Chinese Communist leader spent nine weeks of hard bargaining (December 1949 to February 1950) with the Soviets, which culminated in the signing of a thirty-year Sino-Soviet alliance. Terms of this pact enabled the Soviets pledged to protect China as it continued its

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domestic revolution, while it seized and assimilated all possible outlying areas not already under its control.

While Mao was prevented from fulfilling his desire to seize Taiwan by the presence of the American Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits, he soon involved China in another land war in Asia. Korea had been freed from colonial dependence following the defeat of Japan in 1945; but Soviet intransigence led to a divided Korea where a Soviet-controlled socialist state was established in the north and a non-Communist government under Syngman Rhee was established in the South. Seeking unification of all of Korea under a Communist government, the Soviet-sponsored government in the north invaded South Korea in June of 1950. The United Nations condemned this action and U.N. forces (principally U.S. troops) responded to defend South Korea. In October of 1950, China began a military thrust on two fronts — Chinese troops entered the Korean War after the United Nations troops advanced into North Korea (the People's Republic of Korea) across the 38th parallel. Meanwhile China invaded Tibet in a year long campaign to 'liberate', but actually to brutally subjugate the people of Tibet.(4)

The Invasion of Tibet

The people of Tibet received a warning from the Chinese Communists of what might happen to them soon after the Communist takeover of the mainland. Three months after Mao seized the Chinese mainland, Radio Beijing announced on January 1, 1950 that "the tasks for the People's Liberation Army for 1950 are to liberate Taiwan, Hainan and Tibet." Tibet was described as having fallen under the hands of 'foreign imperialists.' and it was asserted that by liberating Tibet the borders of China would be secured.(5) As is well known, Tibet was at that time fully independent, and in no way under the influence of any external power.

Despite its radio broadcasts and other statements, the People's Republic of China assured India it had no intention of using force against Tibet. China assured even Tibet that its territorial integrity would be maintained and that Tibet could be assured it would keep its independence. While these assurances were being given, the China's People's Liberation Army was moving into position ready to invade Tibet. China made further

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promises to Tibet of 'regional autonomy,' as well as freedom of religion, if the Tibetans would agree to 'peaceful liberation.' Within a few days of this announcement, Chinese troops crossed the Yangtze River, and captured the poorly defended town of Denglog, which was later recaptured by Tibet's minute forces. But on October 7, some 35,000 troops crossed the Yangtse River, launching a major attack on Tibet which was defended by the primitively equipped Tibetan army of 8,500 troops. On October, 25, Beijing Radio announced that its troops had entered Tibet to free it from 'imperialist aggression.' Tibet's Cabinet issued a plea to the United Nations to intervene and stop the Communist aggressors, but China insisted that the Tibetan situation remained an internal matter for China to resolve in its own way.(6) When Britain and India chose to obstruct rather than support the Tibetan appeal for help, nothing was done. Lhasa did not even receive a reply to its last agonized telegram to the United Nations requesting neutral observers to be sent to Tibet to confirm that they were in fact being invaded by the Communist Chinese.

During April of 1951, the Chinese presented a non-representative Tibetan delegation with a ten-point plan detailing the conditions of Tibet's "peaceful liberation," actually a document of surrender. The delegation at first refused their signatures, and especially objected to the section recognizing Tibet as an internal part of China. Threatened with personal violence and with further military action against Tibet, the delegates subsequently signed a new seventeen-point agreement which had a tragic consequence for Tibet – this agreement effectively deprived Tibet of its identity as a separate nation state.(7) Tibetans, in the words of the traveler and correspondent Lowell Thomas Jr., were "left with little but their faith and its symbol, the Dalai Lama."(8)

The Dalai Lama wanted to protect his people but he had no intention of becoming a puppet for the Chinese Communists, and also aware of the well-established tradition of Communist duplicity he was determined to avoid capture. He at first fled to India to seek help, but none was forthcoming.(9)

The Tibetans endured a long period of suffering under Chinese Communist rule. The first blow was the humiliation of losing their identity as a nation-state. Radio Beijing announced the agreement and the consequences: "The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet"

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and "The Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland – the People's Republic of China." Tibet lost its authority to conduct its own foreign affairs. The remnant of the tiny Tibetan army was absorbed into the People's Liberation Army, and China publicly claimed that the local government had "actively" assisted the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet and that the latter was was now consolidating Tibet's "national defense."(10)

Responding to a plea from his fellow countrymen, the Dalai Lama, attempted to coexist with – and preserve some elements of Tibetan culture under – the new Communist rulers. China sent 3,000 troops into Tibet's capital city of Lhasa in September of 1951, heavily armed and carrying banners and portraits of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Within three months more troops arrived, bringing the Chinese occupation force to 20,000, a number equivalent to one half of the city's population. The occupation troops lived off the land, seizing whatever they wanted from the Tibetan population.

One example shows the brutalization of Tibet by the new Chinese overlords. The Chinese government demanded a "loan" of two thousand tons of barley from the Tibetan government. A further two thousand tons demanded broke the back of Lhasa's fraile economy. Prices of grain, meat, and vegetables skyrocketed. The people of Lhasa for the first time in recorded history faced famine. When protests surfaced, the Chinese Communists demanded the resignation of the Tibetan government officials who had expressed opposition to the outrageous Chinese demands. This forced the Dalai Lama to deal directly with the Chinese generals. When it became obvious that the people of Tibet valued their freedom and independence and were not prepared to willingly accede to all demands, the Beijing government simply negated the protective clauses guaranteeing autonomy and religious freedom in the seventeen point agreement and intervened directly in the administration of Tibet.(11)

Tibet was important to China in strategic terms, and its capture helped to permanently to shut China's "back door" as well as to provide an excellent base in central Asia, strategically positioned between the Soviet Union and India.

This land on the roof of the world now began to play a strategic role in China's plan for economic and military development. After seizing control of the Chinese mainland, Mao

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Zedong wanted to build heavy industry and sought Soviet cooperation. The "Great Helmsman" had plans to develop natural resources for industry, involving extensive geological surveys for raw materials in Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. At that time, Mao sought to strengthen the link between Soviet Central Asia with the new industrial areas in the northwest and west of China through the construction of two major railroads, including one which would pass through the Tasidam area of Tibet. These plans were frustrated by the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s.(12)

While Tibet had first been envisioned by Mao as a link for Sino-Soviet development and friendship, it now became a strategic area for the defense of China from any Soviet threat. Mao feared the Chinese nuclear arsenal could be subjected to a Soviet attack from the Turkestan corridor and transferred much of the Chinese nuclear and missile production to Nagchuk, fifty miles north of Lhasa. The establishment of a missile launching site on the high plateau of Tibet represented a major strategic decision, designed to counter the Soviet buildup of military power on China's northwestern border. China also used this move to threaten the Soviet link with India as well as communications to the East Asian segment of the Soviet Union. Several year-round open roads were constructed in Tibet (where many roads are closed by snow for most of the year) and a major radar communications system was established.(13)

The occupation of Tibet also provided an opportunity for the PRC to enforce its policy concerning the fifty-three minority nationalities now under its control, providing "liberation" for all such "oppressed people."(14)

During the almost forty years of Chinese control, the Tibetans have endured Communist "re-education" camps, imprisonment, torture, persecution of their religion, destruction of their temples, cultural "sovietization," and famine. They have seen their land become the site of unwanted Chinese nuclear installations, and much worse, they have endured the chaos and deliberate destruction of historical treasures under Mao's Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

The Tibetans attempted to preserve what they could of their freedom and culture, but the Chinese have not spared any effort to bring them under full communist control. Violating the earlier guarantees of Tibetan autonomy, the Chinese sought

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to impose communism and to wipe out the ancient social, economic and religious customs. Eventually in 1958, one section of Tibetans, the Kampas, rebelled. 180,000 Chinese troops were dispatched to suppress the revolt. Monasteries became the chief targets for attack, and entire monastery complexes with their adjacent villages were obliterated. The methods used by the Communist troops and authorities to subjugate freedom in Tibet included beheading, burning alive, scalding to death, and physical dismemberment. Many of the rebels who were spared death were sent to labor camps. The Chinese used air strikes against defenseless villages and age-old, historic monastaries, traditional centers for contemplation, not violence. An estimated 100,000 people fled, and undoubtedly many more would have left had Tibet not been so isolated.(15)

The year 1959 represented one of the darkest episodes in Tibetan history. The Chinese dissolved the government, and the resulting three days bombardment of Lhasa left 10,000 dead, and centuries of unique cultural, artistic, architectural and historical treasures were destroyed. The Dalai Lama realized that he could not morally continue to live as a symbolic puppet for the Marxists and fled the country. China now imposed a narrow Marxist program on the country, redistributing wealth (actually spreading out poverty and want) and imposing a harsh land reform program. Further persecutions led to imprisonment and executions of government leaders, monks, and any others who would not go along with the Chinese program. Seizing total control of the administration in the annexed "autonomous" territory, Beijing established what it called the Tibet Autonomous Region.(16)

Since the events of 1959, the Dalai Lama in exile has spoken out vigorously against Chinese oppression and has appealed to the West for assistance for his embattered homeland. This religious and temporal leader identified three motivations behind the Communist seizure of Tibet, the first was the acquisition of additional territory to provide the larger living space China needed for its growing population, and the second was the exploitation of the natural mineral wealth of Tibet. The third reason he cites should give pause to the other non-Communist areas of Asia:

> Thirdly, the Chinese intend to dominate Asia, if not the world, as many of them frankly say, and the conquest of Tibet is the first step in this process. I am very far from

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> being a military expert, but common sense suggests that no other country in Asia has the strategic importance of Tibet. With modern weapons, its mountains can be made an almost impregnable citadel from which to launch attacks on India, Burma, Pakistan and the southeast Asian states, in order to dominate these countries, destroy their religions, as ours is being destroyed, and spread the doctrine of atheism further. The Chinese are reported already to have built eighteen airfields in Tibet and a network of military roads through the country. Since they know perfectly well that India had no intention of attacking them, the only possible use for these military preparations is as a base for further expansion.(17)

After an extensive investigation, the International Commission of Jurists concluded in 1959 that China was guilty of genocide against the people of Tibet. The report cited atrocities including destruction of monasteries and religious life, slave labor, and widespread starvation among the Tibetans.(18)

The International Commission on Jurists made a unique and significant contribution to highlighting the situation in Tibet. The ICJ is an independent association of judges, lawyers, and instructors in law representing fifty countries. The group is called upon to investigate suspected violations of the rule of law in their mission seeking to promote the rule of law throughout the world. The Commission examined numerous documents from China and Tibet and interviewed many individuals before concluding that China was guilty of genocide.(19) The Dalai Lama commented on the final report of the ICJ that it had "brought to light more horrors than even I have heard of" and his conclusion was the "the Chinese intend to destroy the Buddhists of Tibet."(20)

A resolution on behalf of Tibet was now sponsored by Ireland and Malaya in the General Assembly of the United Nations, and adopted by the General Assembly on October 21, 1959, calling for "respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life."(21) The PRC ignored the resolution(22) and continued its oppression of Tibetans, meanwhile moving to settle hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese on Tibetan soil – a move to ensure the permanent subjugation of Tibet.

The replacement of Mao Zedong by Deng Xiaoping made only minor and cosmetic differences in the situation in Tibet.

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Deng criticized Mao's policies, and cited Tibet as an area where strong-arm tactics had failed. He replaced some of the Chinese officials in Tibet, authorized the reconstruction and reopening of some of the demolished monasteries, and permitted refugees to return to visit their families. This easing of controls was only a temporary measure. Political prisoners continue to be sent to labor camps(23) and Tibet remains a part of Communist China. The prompt and ruthless suppression of even non-violent protests in Tibet as recently as October 1987, demonstrates Beijing's determination to integrate Tibet into the communist system regardless of all solemn promises, undertakings and signed agreements to permit regional autonomy, religious freedom and all other aspects of human dignity.

The plight of Tibet came forcefully to the attention of the world in 1987, when foreign visitors reported that peaceful protests by Tibetans had led to a brutal crackdown by the Chinese rulers. This Tibetan revolt brought embarrassment to the Chinese rulers as it occurred on October 1st, their National Day celebrating the thirty-eighth anniversary of the Communist Triumph in China. Four days of quiet ensued, and then further protests broke out on October 6. The protests were over a simple but basic issue: a number of Tibetan monks demonstrated peacefully demanding autonomy for Tibet in the capital city of Lhasa. The monks walked around Tibet's holiest shrine, the Jokhang Temple, carrying only small Tibetan flags. Because the Tibetan flag is banned by the communists, police from the Public Bureau of Public Security rushed out and attacked the monks with batons and rifle butts. It remains unclear how many were killed and injured. Foreign visitors in Lhasa witnessed these events and reported how one defenseless monk, who faced his communist oppressors with empty outstretched hands and a smile on his face, was mercilessly shot. The Beijing government sent in reinforcements – detachments of the Peoples Armed Police – to suppress further protests, and closed off Tibet to foreign visitors, ordering all foreigners to leave.(24)

An estimated one thousand additional security police have since been sent into Lhasa, and Beijing has asked India and the U.S. to prevent the Dalai Lama from making or issuing any statements on the political protests in Tibet. Seeking to cover up the events, Beijing propagandists have sought to blame the Dalai Lama for the protests. The Communist Party official,

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Doje Cering, Chairman of the Government of the Tibet Autonomous Region, argued that:

> In 1985, the Dalai Lama sent people to conduct explosions . . . In 1986, the Dalai Lama sent back people to engage in assassinations in Lhasa . . . We have conclusive evidence that the Lhasa riot early this month was instigated and engineered by the Dalai separatist clique.(25)

The policy of Deng may or may not be as heavy-handed as that of Mao toward Tibet, but it still is a policy which denies Tibet independence and suppresses all rights to the Tibetan people. Certainly, the appearance of aggressive, brutal force — followed by an official (U.S.) State Department's sanctioning of recent atrocities — provides occupation forces free reign over a defenseless population. In a meeting with former United States President Jimmy Carter, who was visiting China only three months before the revolt in Tibet, Deng Xiaoping stated that Tibet had great potential for development. He claimed that there had been no ethnic discrimination in the country and declared that China's policy in Tibet was based on the principle of the equality of nationalities. Carter also reported that he had been assured by one of the "religious leaders" in Tibet that all leftist errors of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) had been corrected and that freedom of religion was now guaranteed, and that the Chinese had effected improvements in the national standard of living.(26) Once again, the Communist leaders made use of a respected personality to promote their disinformation campaign. The very effective manipulation of Jimmy Carter was to have dealt a crushing blow to independence movements within and without his troubled land. Knowing or unknowingly the ex-President supported China's interference. When taking a tour of Lhhasa, Carter publicly stated that members of the U.S. Congress who protested actions by the occupying forces were themselves unfamiliar with events there. The official publication *China Reconstructs* reported that Carter did not take issue with claims that Congressional actions "hurt the feelings of the Tibetans.

Despite the fact that Beijing has now closed off Tibet to all foreign eyes and contacts, the evidence of the numerous foreign visitors to the 1987 brutal suppression of Tibetan protests is too extensive to be overlooked. To Beijing, Tibetan autonomy is not a negotiable issue. The *Beijing Review* stated the position in explicit terms:

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> In all, if the Dalai Lama wants to come back, he must abandon the idea of an independent Tibet and of separating Tibet from the motherland. This is a prerequisite for any discussion.(27)

The Chinese have attempted to rewrite the history of Tibet to serve their own purposes. Over the centuries Tibet has been essentially independent and self-governing, with periods of one relationship to China prior to the 1950 invasion. However, a commentator on Beijing Radio criticized newspapers in India for asserting that Tibet had been independent in the past, and rejecting the MacMahon Agreement signed originally between Britain and Tibet, which India still recognizes as the authoritative document in the India-China dispute over India's northern Himalayan frontier. The Beijing commentator declared:

> Tibet has always been a part of China's territory and administered by the central government. Local Tibetan officials have no right to sign territorial treaties with foreign countries. Therefore, the McMahon line is illegal and should be considered null and void.(28)

The United States Congress has vigorously protested the latest evidence of Communist brutality in Tibet. On June 18, 1987, the U.S. House of Representatives unanimously adopted a resolution condemning human rights abuses in Tibet, and the U.S. Senate passed an even stronger resolution by a 98-0 vote on October 6, 1987. The Senate resolution not only condemned human rights abuses in Tibet but called upon the U.S. president to determine if Beijing acted in "good faith" and in a "timely manner" to resolve human rights issues in Tibet.(29)

The concern of the U.S. Congress – and other observers – is that publicity about China's economic "liberalization" may be hiding a policy of brutalization and colonization in Tibet, which has been sealed off from the eyes of the world, worse than the events of the Cultural Revolution, or the 1959 uprising. One aspect of this policy is the transfer of millions of Chinese settlers into Tibet. While Deng Xiaoping has stated that this influx is only one of temporary workers to develop Tibet, and that the Chinese will leave once the projects are finished, students of history will remember that Communist China has used population transfers to control other areas and supplant native culture (e.g., Mongolia, Manchuria, and Eastern Turkestan). The Chinese who move to Tibet received guaranteed jobs, good housing, superior medical care, and their children get

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special preferences in the schools – while the native Tibetans suffer from newly induced unemployment and inflation, in addition to lack of modern conveniences such as running water and electricity, a limited lifespan (i.e., forty years of age), a high infant mortality rate, and a high rate of illiteracy (i.e., seventy percent). The city of Lhasa has an estimated 4,000 political prisoners, and in Central Tibet there is one Communist soldier for every ten Tibetans. The future remains bleak for the Tibetans notwithstanding the "liberalization" policies of Deng Xiaoping.(30)

While the population of Hong Kong, Macao, and the Republic of China on Taiwan are mostly Chinese, there is a clear lesson in the Tibetan situation: the intransigent nature of the Chinese Communist government whether under the leadership of Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping, is rooted in their determination to gain control of any and all territory which they consider their own, using promises of "regional autonomy" or "separate autonomous region" as a facade which they can discard at will. Such pretenses serve to hide the fact that the Communists are willing to use any means, no matter how brutal, to completely control the territories they dominate.

The events in Tibet should serve as a caution for those advocates who see Beijing's invitation to the Republic of China on Taiwan to accept a peaceful merger with the mainland with the principle of "one country, two systems" as a sufficient guarantee for the freedom of the people on Taiwan. The People's Republic of China made the same claim on Tibet as on Taiwan – that it had no right to be a separate country but was a part of China and must therefore come under the Beijing government. They promised it self-government and religious freedom as a Special Autonomous Region, but did not keep this promise. But Tibet was isolated and somewhat inaccessible, whereas Taiwan is a defensible island with a strong military. Professor Gary Bullert of the Troy State University of Alabama has pointed out how Beijing has sought to apply the same tactics it used to undermine Tibet as it is applying to the Republic of China on Taiwan. These similarities include:

1. isolating first Tibet, and now Taiwan, politically and diplomatically;
2. securing the acknowledgement by the United States that first Tibet, and now Taiwan, was a part of China;
3. the proposal for limited autonomy, made earlier to

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Tibet, is now being made to Taiwan;

4. invitation for refugees from both areas to return home to visit their families; and

5. emphasis through, the use of Western journalists, that Deng and his pragmatic rulers are giving Tibet economic prosperity and modernization and would allow Taiwan to continue its free enterprise system after unification with the mainland, while all the time covering up the details of the totalitarian nature of the Beijing regime.

Bullert has pointed out the threat to Taiwan by showing what has happened to Tibet. He also notes in a perceptive commentary the longer lessons of Tibet, especially noting the danger in which a nation places itself when it relies for assistance merely on the moral sympathy of world opinion:

> However, reliance upon the continued goodwill of other nations for survival remains the essence of strategic vulnerability. Dependence upon the shifting tide of American presidential politics does not insure long-range security, even if Taiwan is demonstrably a vital strategic link in the American defense perimeter in Asia. Finally, the ultimate political lesson to be learned from Communist China's seizure of Tibet is that nations have the choice of modernizing themselves militarily, or of being modernized forcibly by alien occupation forces. Even Tibet, long protected by its geographic remoteness, could not escape that iron law.(31)

FOOTNOTES

(1) Peter Hopkirk, *Trespassers on the Roof of the World: The Secret Exploration of Tibet,* Los Angeles: J. P. Tarcher, Inc., 1982, pp. 5-6.

(2) John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: The Modern Transformation,* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965, pp. 52, 794-795.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid., p. 871. The treaty of friendship with the Soviets ended with the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s.

(5) John F. Avedon, *In Exile from the Land of Snows,* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984, pp. 26-27.

(6) Ibid., pp. 27-32.

(7) Ibid., pp. 35-36.

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(8) Lowell Thomas Jr., *The Silent War in Tibet*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959, p. 98.

(9) Ibid., pp. 98-100. Thomas discusses the power and influence on Tibetans of the Dalai Lama: "If he crossed the border, the heart of the people would go with him. The devotion he commanded was unquestioning. He could lead his subjects where no army could force them to go. If the Communists did not know this, they would have to learn it before they could expect to dominate the mountain kingdom." Ibid., p. 100.

(10) Avendon, *In Exile from the Land of Snows*, p. 36.

(11) Ibid., pp. 37-39.

(12) Franz Michael, *Mao and the Perpetual Revolution*, Woodbury, New York: Barron's, 1977, pp. 110-111.

(13) Ibid., p. 208.

(14) Ibid., pp. 41-42.

(15) Ibid., pp. 47-48.

(16) Ibid., pp. 215-224, 226-227, 268.

(17) Dalai Lama, *My Land and My People*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962, pp. 223-224. While concluding that China had all these aims in mind when they conquered Tibet, he observes that this latter aim – the desire to conquer Asia and the world – "made it imperative for them to carry through their conquest even after they found how much it was going to cost them in materials and lives and guilt." Ibid., p. 224.

(18) International Commission of Jurists, *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law*, Geneva: United Nations Publishing House, 1959, cited in Gary Bullert, "The Chinese Occupation of Tibet: A Lesson from History," *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, 11 (Spring, 1986), No. 1, p. 30.

(19) Dalai Lama, *My Land and My People*, pp. 221, 223.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Ibid., pp. 229-230. The resolution was adopted on a vote of 45 favorable, 9 against, and 26 abstaining. The Dali Lama noted: "I had hoped that the Chinese cared about international opinion, but this resolution had no noticeable affect on them." Ibid., p. 230.

(22) Ibid., pp. 230-231.

(23) Bullert, "The Chinese Occupation of Tibet," pp. 31-32.

(24) Robert Delfs, "Tibet's turbulent monks," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 15, 1987, pp. 8-9.

(25) Edward A. Gargan, "Tibetan Communists Link Riots to Dalai Lama," *The New York Times*, November 1, 1987, p. 8. Gargan noted that no proof was given for the charge against the Dali Lama. Despite the statement by Communist officials denying Tibet was closed to foreign reporters asserting they needed only to make application to go there, foreign journalists were complaining that they were requesting permission to do so and could not get permission to visit Tibet from Beijing. See also "China isolates Tibet on 37th anniversary of rule," October 8, 1987, p. 5, and "Chinese order some travelers to leave troubled Tibet in week," October 10, 1987, *The Chicago Tribune*; "Tibet may jolt China's rulers," Agence France-Presse, published in the *Chicago Sun Times*, October 10, 1987, p. 6.

(26) "Jimmy Carter See Truth About Tibet," *Beijing Review*, 30 (July 6, 1987), No. 28, p. 7.

(27) "Questions and Answers on Tibet," *Beijing Review*, 30 (July 13, 1987), No. 28.

(28) "Indian Newspapers Spread Lies About Tibet," *Beijing Review*, 30 (August 10, 1987), No. 32, p. 25; See also "Chronology: Roots in the Past," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 15, 1987, p. 10.

(29) John Avedon, "China's Tibetan Anschluss," *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, August 10, 1987, p. 8; Nayan Chanda, "Congress takes a hand: Senate vote on Tibet

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could upset Sino-U.S. relations," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 15, 1987, p. 10.

(30) Avedon, "China's Tibetan Anschluss," p. 8. Avedon writes that Deng Xiaoping made an effort in 1977 to resolve the issue of Tibet by having the Tibet government in exile dispatch missions throughout Tibet. The delegations were met by enthusiastic groups who urged the delegates to talk about the oppression of Tibet. Beijing terminated this effort at rapprochment and began a policy of massive influx of Chinese. The author notes: "The Sinocrization of Tibet is no more accidental than its military occupation . . . Sinocrization is the requisite corollary to open force: a subtle but effective means to submerge the identity of Peking's most intransient subject race. As one nominally high ranking Tibetan cadre confided to a party of German legislators: 'Do not be deceived by the talk of liberalization and religious freedom. It is not real. We live in a large burning hole of fire.'"

(31) Bullert, "The Chinese Occupation of Tibet," p. 35. For additional information, see two publications by Michael C. van Walt van Praag, who has taught International Law and Tibetan Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and is a former director of the Tibetan Affairs Coordination Office in the Netherlands. "Tibet and the Right to Self-Determination," *Wayne Law Review*, Vol. 26 (1979), No. 1 and *Population Transfer and the Survival of the Tibetan Identity*, prepared for the Seventh Annual International Human Rights Symposium and Research Conference at Columbia University (June 13, 1986) and published in the Special Report Series by the U.S. Tibet Committee (New York, 1986). See also "The Independent Status of Tibet: An Historical Note," New York: Potala Publications. The material is available through the Office of Tibet, 107 East 31st Street, New York, New York 10016.

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EDUCATION AND ETHNICITY:
The U.S. Experiment in School Education

By Dr. Ralph Scott
Director, Educational Clinic, University of Northern Iowa

PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL DISADVANTAGE: A NEW DILEMMA FOR AMERICAN BLACKS



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"Push-Through" Educational Programs.

It is perplexing that circumstances have worsened for literally millions of minority youths during a period which has witnessed the burgeoning of special programs designed to help them. For more than three decades the entire structure of U.S. education has been dramatically reshaped. However, as U.S. schools become racially 'balanced,' educators were forced to deal with large ethnic achievement gaps at the high school level. It is not uncommon, for example, for a tenth grade student to have trouble reading a third grade textbook while sitting beside classmates capable of college work. Typically, ability grouping was abolished, and classrooms and instructional groupings were racially balanced. Other race-conscious intervention measures followed: informal quotas on student discipline, on grading practices and in composition of 'special' classrooms. Ethnic quotas on discipline and suspensions have forced teachers to tolerate behavior which is most efficaciously curbed during the formative years. Racial quotas for exceptional students have radically altered what is meant by the terms 'mentally retarded,' 'gifted' and 'learning disabled.' Uncritical promotions have led to unacceptably high failure rates in high school and universities. The sensitive racial topics consideed throughout this book are intended to promote rethinking of basic educational strategies which have proven to be harmful for both black and white students alike.

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THE DECEPTIVE NATURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS: GUBERNATORIAL AND SENATORIAL ELECTIONS IN 1982

By Edward W. Chester

Foreign observers long have been confused by the political scene in the United States. This perhaps is not surprising, since the latter is quite complex, and does not easily yield its secrets. A recently completed survey of 4,244 adults conducted by Gallup President Andrew Kohut and American Enterprise Institute political analyst Norman Ornstein offers further proof of the conflicting forces at work.(1) To Kohut and Ornstein, "The conventional way of defining our politics – in terms such as liberal and conservative, Republican, Democrat and Independent – bears little relation to the true, diverse nature of the electorate."

In addition, developments at the national level in America during Presidential election years, including national party platforms(2) and Presidential inaugural addresses,(3) do not necessarily coincide with developments at the state level during the off-year or mid-term elections. (This stands in sharp contrast to those countries with a more unitary politics.) We will offer proof of the validity of this generalization during the course of this article, which will focus on Republican and Democratic gubernatorial campaign literature during 1982.

The Democrats set up their national committee as early as 1848, with the Republicans following suit after the birth of their party in the mid-1850s. However, today the national committees of both parties do not strictly control the activities of the fifty state parties, or those of the even more numerous county or city parties. When the state parties hold their conventions the platforms which they adopt usually vary somewhat in content and emphasis from the quadrennial platforms which the national party conventions draw up.

There is a well-defined hierarchy of party leadership in both houses of Congress, but neither the Senate Majority Leader nor the Speaker of the House (nor their minority party counter-

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CHART ONE

Republican Gubernatorial Candidates			Democratic Gubernatorial Candidates		
1	(tie) more industry/new jobs	20	1	more industry/new jobs	21
1	(tie) hold down taxes, reform the tax system	20	2	improve schools	16
3	improve schools	17	3	(tie) aid to senior citizens	12
4	fight crime	16	3	(tie) fight crime	12
5	curtail governmental spending	11	3	(tie) assistance to agriculture	12
6	stop proliferation of state employees	10	6	hold down taxes/reform tax structure	11

parts) are able to force their fellow Republicans or Democrats to vote a certain way on a specific issue, although at times they may attempt to discipline those mavericks who resist the party line. This is probably even more true today than it was a quarter of a century ago. One reason why incumbent members of the House of Representatives seeking re-election are almost invulnerable is that they usually place the interests of their district first, even though the latter may conflict with the positions taken by the national party.

Although observers both in the United States and abroad refer to the Republicans as the more "conservative" party and the Democrats as the more "liberal" party, the fact remains that each party is a complete political spectrum in itself. One finds such liberals as Clifford Case and Jacob Javits in the Republican Party along with such conservatives as Barry Goldwater and Robert Taft, while such conservatives as Richard Russell and Harry Byrd, Sr. are members of the Democratic Party, just as such liberals as Hubert Humphrey and George McGovern are. The party organizations at the state, county, and city levels may field "slates" of candidates, but this does not keep anyone who chooses to do so from running for office as a Republican or a Democrat . . . and sometimes winning despite the fact that he or she does not have the backing of the party leaders, or may even face the bitter opposition of the latter.

In view of the growing complexity of issues which confront the voters today, it is perhaps not surprising that voters may cast their ballots for or against a candidate because of his or her stand on a specific issue: the Panama Canal treaties, abortion, etc. Recent years have seen a proliferation of political action committees, which are usually identified with a political ideology such as conservatism, or a specific issue such as gun control. Nevertheless, as we will see, the campaign literature of individual Republican and Democrat officeholders and candidates remains as extensive and complex in many instances as the national party platforms. After describing the contents of a large collection of this campaign material from the 1982 midterm election, we will attempt to explain why on balance it tends to the middle of the road ideologically, and is frequently characterized by ideological inconsistency.

Early in 1982 the author telephoned the Republican and Democratic National Committees in Washington, D.C., and

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CHART TWO

Republican Senatorial Candidates			Democratic Senatorial Candidates		
1	(tie) cut governmental spending ing and budget deficits/ balance the budget	13	1	Social Security/old people	18
			2	reduce interest rates and the cost of living	14
1	(tie) make the tax system fair	13	3	(tie) create jobs/cut unemployment	12
5	(tie) a strong defense	10	3	(tie) cut governmental spending and budget deficits/balance the budget	12
5	(tie) Social Security/old people	10	5	(tie) improve education	11
			5	(tie) make the tax system fair	11

thanks to their cooperation he was able to obtain the names and addresses of the national committeepersons and state chairpersons in all fifty states, whom he then proceeded to write.(4) Out of those officials contacted, approximately three-fourths furnished him with either campaign literature for various races and/or the names and campaign headquarters addresses of various candidates. The end result of this extensive correspondence was the assembling of a collection of 330 pieces of campaign literature from candidates of both major parties from all over the country. In the case of the 435 House races the author was only able to obtain a significant sampling – 233 candidates provided him with usable material(5) – but in the case of the gubernatorial contests he received responses from over two-thirds of the candidates, with a similarly high percentage for the Senate races. Thus in both of the latter categories there is ample material for an objective scholar to examine, to analyze, and to turn into meaningful conclusions.

In processing the 51 pieces of campaign literature from the 1982 election, divided almost equally between Republican (26) and Democratic (25) gubernatorial candidates, one of the first things which one notices is the fact that the absence of a party label was the rule rather than the exception. In the ranks of both major parties only a half-dozen candidates openly described themselves as either Republicans or Democrats . . . less than one-quarter of the overall total. Even rarer was an overt identification with a political philosophy. Only Bill Workman, the unsuccessful Republican candidate in South Carolina, and Mark White, the successful Democratic candidate in Texas, affirmed their basic conservativism, and White qualified this identification with the observation that: ". . . people need to know that conservatism really isn't at odds with compassion." Amazingly, *no* candidate – either Republican or Democrat – openly embraced liberalism, while the unsuccessful Republican candidate in Maine, Charles Cragin, characterized himself as a "problem solver."

Significantly, no candidate from either major party focused his or her campaign on support for, or opposition to, President Ronald Reagan. Several Democrats did criticize "the Administration" during the course of their presentation, but did so without mentioning Reagan by name. Only in South Dakota, where Democrat Mike O'Connor unsuccessfully challenged Republican incumbent Bill Janklow, did Reagan figure directly

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in the attack. (O'Connor complained that Janklow had gone on record as a staunch supporter of Reaganomics.)

In contrast, five Republican gubernatorial candidates — approximately 20 per cent of the G.O.P. nominees surveyed here — made direct reference to Reagan, but in no case was there a photograph of the President, either alone or together with the gubernatorial candidate. William P. Clements, Jr. of Texas, in fact, stated that "He supports President Reagan when he is right, as on national defense, oil decontrol, and opposition to busing, (but) . . . opposes the President when the Administration seems to be off the track." (No specifics were given.) Rather than being offended by the latter, "President Reagan respects Bill Clements' independent and frank way of speaking." Other Republican gubernatorial candidates also mentioned Reagan favorably with respect to the New Federalism (Florida and Kansas), block grants (Maine), and his promise never to place an embargo only on exports of agricultural products (Nebraska). Bob Bell of Georgia also endorsed the New Federalism, without directly referring to Reagan.

In view of the fact that the different regions, or sections, of the country have somewhat different interests, it is also striking that the campaign literature examined does not reveal more of a geographical division on issues. Candidates running for office in Southern states, for example, did not offer brochures to the voter with a significantly different flavor than their counterparts from the Western states. Such issues as more industry, new jobs, improved schools, fighting crime, assistance to agriculture, aid to senior citizens, holding down taxes, reforming the tax system, curtailing governmental spending, and stopping the proliferation of governmental employees are of interest to voters of every state, not just those of one geographical region or section.

The relative emphasis which Republican and Democratic gubernatorial candidates as a whole placed on these issues, however, did differ somewhat. A tally of the key issues by party reveals the distribution in Chart One.

What is least surprising about the above ranking is that twice as many Republican gubernatorial candidates favored holding down taxes and reforming the tax system as did their Democratic counterparts, while twice as many Republican gubernatorial candidates advocated the curtailment of government spending, and favored a halt to the proliferation of state

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employees, as did their Democratic counterparts. It is quite apparent that a liberal Democrat in office usually tends to tax, and to spend, more, than a conservative Republican. While those gubernatorial candidates of both parties who favored tax reform recommended, among other things, changes in both property and inheritance taxes, Democratic gubernatorial candidates in Kansas and Wyoming endorsed a severance tax, a tax advocated by no Republican gubernatorial candidate. One of the current Democratic criticisms of the Republicans is that the latter are too insensitive to the exploitation for profit of this country's mineral resources.

Far more unexpected is the fact that, despite the fact that the Democrats constantly accuse the Republicans of being the party of big business, Democratic gubernatorial candidates are just as eager as their Republican counterparts to create a favorable business climate which will attract new industry to a state, and thus provide more jobs. Thus two-term Democratic Governor Richard Lamm of Colorado boasted that he had made Colorado so attractive to industry that it ranked third nationally in overall business climate. At the same time, however, Lamm sounded a precautionary note: "The balance between development and environment, between boom and bust, is a precarious one. Unless we take note and learn from our past, we are sure to repeat it."

Gubernatorial candidates of both major parties placed an equal emphasis on improving schools at all levels: elementary, junior high, high school, and college and university. This quite naturally costs money, and one would expect that the more fiscally conservative Republicans would be more hesitant to spend governmental funds on education than their more liberal Democratic counterparts. But this issue was complicated in many states by the tying of educational funding to educational reforms of various types. Thus the incumbent Republican Governor of Texas, William P. Clements, Jr., incurred the wrath of numerous public school teachers in his unsuccessful re-election bid by recommending, among other things, that new teachers pass competency tests "to guarantee that our children are well-taught." Ironically, the Democratic victor, Mark White, as Governor implemented a series of educational reforms which included, among other things, competency testing.

One reason why more Americans belong to the Democratic Party than to the Republican Party is that more special interest

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groups identify with the former than with the latter. Thus it is hardly unexpected that the Democratic gubernatorial candidates frequently make a serious effort to appeal to the latter; farmers and senior citizens are cases in point. Mike O'Connor displayed his concern for agriculture in his memorable comment that: "Oil gushes out of the ground in the Arab countries, and they become rich. Food gushes out of the ground in South Dakota, and we remain poor."

However, in view of their tendency to vote Democratic, it is hardly surprising that the Democratic candidates in only five states called for the appointment of blacks, Hispanics, and women to governmental posts, and/or equal educational and job opportunities for them. This total only exceeds that of their Republican counterparts by one. As a matter of fact, only one Democratic gubernatorial candidate (Rudy Perpich of Minnesota) emphasized the Equal Rights Amendment; the Republican gubernatorial candidate in Georgia (Bob Bell) favored this, while his G.O.P. counterpart in South Carolina (Bill Workman) opposed this amendment, but favored "eliminating from (the) state code any statutes which discriminate on basis of sex, race, etc." One might suggest here that at least some of these Democratic gubernatorial candidates, in de-emphasizing minorities, may have been reacting to the widespread feeling that the Democratic Party is no longer the party of the average white male.

Liberal Democrats throughout the nation have been highly critical of wire tapping to expose drug traffic, and capital punishment as cruel and inhumane, but a dozen Democratic gubernatorial candidates still made the war on crime a campaign issue, in comparison with 16 Republicans. The same three-to-four ratio held in the Democratic advocacy of capital punishment, as well as their favoring a crackdown on drugs. No less than a half-dozen Democrats embraced the anti-drunk driving crusade, while only the Republican gubernatorial candidate in Georgia (Bob Bell) did this.

As for various other issues, Democratic gubernatorial candidates showed a greater concern than their Republican counterparts by a 7 to 3 margin for providing more housing, through such devices as low interest rates. Four of the former also exhibited an interest in regulating public utilities, as contrasted with no Republicans. On the other hand, the Republican gubernatorial candidates favored reforming the welfare system

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by a 4 to 1 margin over their Democratic counterparts, still another evidence of the basically more conservative ideological thrust of the G.O.P.

Likewise of interest is what one does not find, or rarely encounters, in this gubernatorial campaign literature. There were no references at all to other nations, aside from one by the Democratic candidate for Governor of Florida (Bob Graham) to the Cuban refugee crisis.(6) Such economic activities as banking and fishing received a lone mention apiece – parimutual betting with two citations received more – while a single gubernatorial candidate of each party separately addressed the needs of abused children and veterans. Only the Republican candidate for Governor of Georgia (Bob Bell), moreover, made a new state constitution an issue, and he was the only candidate to raise the issue of gun control (against) and school prayer (for). One must therefore conclude that despite its widespread emphasis on fiscal responsibility, this collected body of gubernatorial campaign literature does not reveal an equal preoccupation with social conservatism.

All of these candidates for Governor, regardless of party, unquestionably regarded themselves as far-sighted men or women. Yet only three explicitly took credit for implementing long-range planning for their state. Republicans Sam Hardage and William P. Clements, Jr. respectively created a "Kansas 2000 Commission" and a "Texas 2000 Commission," while Democrat George Ariyoshi of Hawaii developed the first state plan in the nation to provide guidelines for his state's future growth and development. Ariyoshi, it should be noted, listed an additional 100 reasons why he should be re-elected Governor. (He won.)

What general conclusions, then, are we to draw from this collected body of gubernatorial campaign literature from the 1982 off-year election? In the first place, there obviously are significant ideological differences between the Republican and Democratic parties. Republican gubernatorial candidates are less likely to tax and spend, welfare being a case in point, while the Democratic ones are more likely to cater to the needs of special interest groups such as senior citizens, to protect the environment and to preserve natural resources, to regulate public utilities, and to make available more housing. Yet the approximately equal attention paid by both parties to such issues as more industry and new jobs, better schools, and an expanded

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transportation network demonstrates that the two parties are by no means polarized on every issue at the state level.

As for the Senatorial campaign literature, one finds both similarities and differences between it and the gubernatorial campaign literature. While only a quarter of the gubernatorial candidates in the campaign literature surveyed in writing this article openly identified themselves with their party, the percentage was much higher in the case of the Senatorial contests (approximately 60 per cent), with Democratic candidates more likely to do so than their Republican counterparts by a narrow margin. However, highly emphasized identification as contrasted with merely passing identification is a quite different matter; here the Democrats enjoyed a four-to-one margin over the Republicans. Significantly, the two Republicans who proclaimed themselves to be members of the G.O.P. on the title page of their brochures or in some other prominent location failed to win their contests: Jim Keck in Nebraska and Larry Williams in Montana.

But again, as in the gubernatorial races, no Senatorial candidate of either party openly stated that he or she was a liberal. Aside from veteran Democratic Senator John Stennis of Mississippi and his "fiscal conservative leadership," the other six candidates who made reference to their conservatism were all Republicans. Only two of the latter, though – incumbents Robert Stafford of Vermont and Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming – won their election bids. Attacks on Democratic incumbent "Lloyd the Liberal" Bentsen of Texas did not win long-time Republican Congressman James Collins a Senate seat, nor did the espousing of conservative principles result in victory for Republican challengers in Maine, Ohio, and Maryland.

Unlike their gubernatorial counterparts, candidates for the United States Senate generally run on their own rather than as part of a team. One exception was New York, where Republican Florence Sullivan linked her candidacy with that of gubernatorial nominee Lew Lehrman, only to lose decisively to Democratic incumbent Daniel Patrick Moynihan. But this "lone wolf" stance on the part of candidates for the U.S. Senate is perhaps to be expected, since unlike the gubernatorial candidates they have no other state race to which they might link their candidacy.

Since U.S. Senate races are contests for a national office, it is perhaps not surprising that these candidates placed a greater

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emphasis on Ronald Reagan than their gubernatorial counterparts. But even here only 6 of the 41 Senatorial candidates whose campaign literature we have surveyed made any significant references to the incumbent chief executive; four Republicans and two Democrats. The only winners from this group, moreover, were the two incumbent Republican Senators, Westerners Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming (who warned that: "They will try to persuade you to stop the clock on Ronald Reagan.") and Orrin Hatch of Utah (who endorsed the Reagan recovery). Less successful was three-term Congressman Larry Hogan of Maryland, who was pictured with both Reagan and former President Gerald Ford, and Larry Williams of Montana, who proclaimed that Reaganomics would "absolutely" work.

Unquestionably the most blatantly partisan of all this Senatorial campaign literature was the postcard distributed by Democratic Julie Michaelson of Rhode Island, who unsuccessfully challenged Republican incumbent John Chafee. On one side of this postcard one finds the statement that Michaelson "will vote Yes for you and No to President Reagan." On the other side there is the even more vehement proclamation that: "Julie Michaelson is the LAST man that Ronald Reagan wants in the U.S. Senate." Equally unsuccessful was Democratic challenger Cyril Wecht of Pennsylvania. In an observation which mirrored the 57 varieties of Heinz products Wecht stated that: "John Heinz has 57 varieties of excuses for supporting Reaganomics while Pennsylvania has the third highest unemployment in the nation."

As is the case with the gubernatorial campaign literature, the campaign literature distributed by candidates of both major parties in the U.S. Senate races does not reflect a strong regional flavor. Cyril Wecht did state in a negative vein that he "will fight to reverse the flow of industries and taxes to the Sun Belt." More positive sectional references were those of Republican David Durenberger of Minnesota, who favored measures benefitting the Great Lakes region, and Democratic Senators John Stennis of Mississippi (who had worked for the inclusion of his state in the Appalachian Development Act), and James Sasser of Tennessee (who wanted to reform the Tennessee Valley Authority.) But despite these isolated cases, such issues as Social Security, more jobs, reduced governmental spending, a more equitable tax system, lower interest rates, and a strong national defense are of national concern, and it is these issues

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which dominate the Senatorial campaign literature for 1982 which we have surveyed.

In comparison with the leading issues in the gubernatorial contests for this year, Republicans and Democrats were just as much in agreement, if not more so, with respect to the key issues in the Senatorial contests. The top five issues by party are shown in Chart Two.

In view of their constant attacks on the Reagan Administration for attempting to reduce governmental spending for social programs, it comes as no surprise that nearly twice as many Democratic Senatorial candidates stressed the Social Security-old people theme in their campaign literature as did their Republican counterparts. As a matter of fact, only four Democrats failed to raise this issue; this parallels the concern on the part of gubernatorial candidates of this party for senior citizens. Conversely, it was the Republican Senatorial candidates – but only several of them – who advocated various food stamp reforms, including a reduction in benefits, partial payment by recipients, and the denial of food stamps to college students and strikers.

It is only consistent with the Reagan Administration's ongoing defense buildup that the Republican Senatorial candidates made defense one of their top issues . . . unlike their Democratic counterparts, only a third of whom mention it.(7) (This, of course, is rarely an issue in the gubernatorial races.) The Democrats outdistanced the Republicans by a three-to-one margin, moreover, in calling for the elimination of waste in defense spending. Of all the Democratic Senatorial candidates, it was incumbent John Stennis of Mississippi who not only made defense the number one priority in his campaign literature, but also bragged of the federal military installations which he had brought to Mississippi. Senator Dennis De Concini of Arizona also struck a hawkish note in his endorsement of the MX missile and B-1 bomber. As for the Republican candidates, both Senator John Chafee of Rhode Island and Lowell Weicker of Connecticut broke with the Republican consensus by adopting dovish stances in their respective opposition to the B-1 bomber and unworkable basing systems for the MX missile, and to neutron bombs, the MX missile itself, and chemical warfare.

Less expected was the greater emphasis in their campaign literature by the Democratic Senatorial candidates – by nearly a two-to-one margin – in reducing the interest rate and the cost

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of living. Both, of course, were higher under President Jimmy Carter than under President Ronald Reagan, under whom they have come down; again both the interest rate and the cost of living are national issues more than state ones. If the Democrats did have a case against the Reagan Administration in the economic sphere, it was that unemployment under the incumbent chief executive at times reached the double digit range. Republican and Democratic Senatorial candidates, however, placed an approximately equal stress on the need to create jobs and to reduce unemployment. This, it will be recalled, was the number one issue of both the Democratic and Republican gubernatorial candidates.

Certainly a key factor in stimulating the economy has been the controversial 25 per cent reduction in personal income taxes which the Reagan Administration had made the focal point of its domestic program. While seven Republican Senatorial candidates emphasized tax cuts in their campaign literature, it is not surprising that none of their Democratic counterparts did so; the Republicans also were more favorably disposed to tax indexing than were the Democrats. The Democrats, though, did outstrip their Republican rivals by a nearly two-to-one margin in their call to make the tax system "fair." A persistent Democratic campaign theme was the accusation that too many people (especially wealthy individuals and large corporations) were legally evading their fair share of the tax burden. (How the passage of the tax reform law of 1986 will affect this remains to be seen.) This relatively equal stress on taxes in the Senatorial campaigns contrasts with the gubernatorial contests, where Republican candidates exhibited twice as great of an interest in taxes than did their Democratic counterparts.

But although it has been the liberal Democrats rather than the conservative Republicans who have spent the most heavily on social programs, Democratic and Republican Senatorial candidates were almost equally committed to reducing governmental spending, eliminating waste, and cutting budgetary deficits. Again this contrasts with the gubernatorial races, where twice as many Republicans as Democrats advocated the curtailment of governmental spending, and favored a halt to the proliferation of state employees, as did their Democratic counterparts. At the national level a balanced budget – generally regarded as a conservative theme – also found equal favor with candidates of both parties. Of course, as has been

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apparent for a number of years, the Democrats are more likely to call for cuts in defense spending, the Republicans for a reduction in social programs.

On the other hand, environmental protection is usually regarded as a liberal issue, but an equal number of Senatorial candidates of both major parties stressed this theme in their campaign literature. As one might expect, by a nearly two-to-one margin Democratic Senatorial candidates placed more of an emphasis on civil rights, and on equal treatment for women and minorities, than did their Republican counterparts, yet these still did not rank as leading Democratic issues. Successful Democratic Senatorial candidate Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey, moreover, took openly liberal positions with respect to favoring abortion and gun control, while opposing school prayer.

In surveying this body of campaign literature, one of the big surprises was the reluctance of many Republican Senatorial candidates who embraced fiscal conservatism (tax cuts, etc.) likewise to advocate social conservatism. We thus find only one Republican candidate opposing forced busing, and only one criticizing both gun registration laws and pornography. But if one regards the quest for law and order as a basically Republican theme (as with Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew in 1970), it is not unexpected that twice as many Republicans called for a campaign against crime as did their Democratic counterparts. While only Democratic Senator Dennis De Concini of Arizona endorsed the death penalty, five Republican Senatorial candidates did so.

Although foreign policy was a major issue in both 1950 (Korean War) and 1962 (Cuban missile crisis), it was not so in 1982, despite the numerous unresolved crises facing the world. Neither major party made it a prime concern, at least in the Senatorial campaign literature which we are examining here. Whereas Dennis De Concini of Arizona opposed SALT II, seven other Democrats favored arms reduction and a nuclear freeze . . . including defense-minded Senator Henry Jackson of Washington. Of the five Republicans who took similar positions, four were from New England. Senator De Concini, moreover, attacked Cuban and Soviet expansion in Central America, and called for the release of political and religious dissidents from Russia. His campaign literature is in many respects the most anti-Communist of those surveyed, but Republican Florence

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Sullivan in her failed bid for a Senate seat in New York suggested that the United States should keep a watch on such aggressive Communist nations as the Soviet Union.

Protecting against foreign trade competition was another issue stressed by a disproportionate number of Senatorial candidates from the North and the East, where over the years there has been a heavy concentration of manufacturing and industry. The only exception against was Senator De Concini. Two Senatorial candidates from each party also called for a ban on future embargoes of agricultural products. They came from such Middle Western states as Minnesota, Ohio, and Michigan, however, rather than from New England or the Middle Atlantic States.

As for other foreign policy issues, one encounters only isolated references in this body of Senatorial campaign literature, aside from the handful of candidates (three Republicans and two Democrats) who mentioned such Central American countries as Nicaragua, Panama, and El Salvador. Only Democrat Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey called for U.S. support for a strong Israel, although Republican Lowell Weicker of Connecticut did oppose the sale of AWACS and F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Despite Democratic President Jimmy Carter's earlier human rights campaign, moreover, it was Republican John Heinz of Pennsylvania who made this an issue, not some Democratic Senatorial candidate. Senator De Concini also opposed foreign aid and foreign assistance in general, while Republican Robert Stafford of Vermont proposed the establishment of a peace academy and an International Center for Peace.

In summary, after examining the body of campaign literature made available by Senatorial candidates of both parties, one must conclude that — as is the case with the gubernatorial campaign literature — partisan and ideological differences are not as great as one might expect. The Democrats did place a greater emphasis on safeguarding Social Security and protecting old people, as well as on reducing interest rates and holding down the cost of living, while the Republicans made a strong defense a key priority. But social conservatism did not emerge as a major Republican issue, and the percentage of Democrats who emphasized women, blacks, and Hispanics also was not large.

Certainly this body of campaign literature does not reflect the degree of conservative-liberal polarization which one en-

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counters in a detailed breakdown of the complete voting record of incumbent Senators. Since this involves literally hundreds of issues, an incumbent Senator running for re-election may release seemingly comprehensive pieces of campaign literature noting his or her positions on dozens of issues, without giving a truly accurate picture of his or her overall ideological stance, or his or her position on numerous key issues which might alienate voters, were this widely publicized.(8) Here, even more than in the case of the governorships, the average voter is confronted with such a complex mass of political data that he or she may vote for or against a candidate on the basis of his or her stand on some controversal issue, such as the Panama Canal treaties, rather than on the basis of his or her complete voting record.

The overall picture which emerges from this in-depth examination of both gubernatorial and Senatorial campaign literature from the 1982 off-year election is hardly one of race after race in which hard-core conservative and hard-core liberal candidates engaged in clearly drawn ideological battles. Not only were the ideological lines between the candidates frequently blurred, there were times where one could neither identify a candidate as a Republican or a Democrat — nor as a conservative or a liberal — on the basis of his or her campaign literature! Indeed, what we witnessed all too often in these 1982 mid-term contests was a stampede to the ideological center of the road, an avoidance of extremes, and an attempt to be all things to all people.

In other words, there appears to be a basic ideological core to much, if not most, of this campaign literature, and one finds this core in the campaign literature of Republicans and Democrats, as well as conservatives and liberals. At the national level Republicans may call for reforms in Social Security, but not challenge Social Security itself; Democrats may advocate a strong defense, while still favoring the elimination of waste. Although they may differ in specifics as to how it is to be achieved, both parties endorse a balanced budget and a reduction in unemployment. At the state level Republicans as well as Democrats favor more industry coming to a state, better schools, and less crime. And at both levels many candidates of both parties avoid taking ideological positions associated politically with the far right and the far left, despite the fact that the latter are often vociferous, and frequently set up

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political action committees and conduct single issue campaigns.

One might also suggest that there is a fairly strong correlation between the basic ideological core of this campaign literature and public opinion polls. Most officeholders and candidates rely on pollsters to at least some extent, and the results of the polls may have as much of an impact on the issues as do the national party platforms, the single issue crusades, or the political action committees.

If this campaign literature is at times confusing and contradictory, so are the public opinion polls. This has been confirmed on numerous occasions by George Gallup, Louis Harris, Elmo Roper and others, long before Kohut and Ornstein conducted their recent survey. A majority of those polled, for example, usually support the elimination of waste in governmental spending, yet at the same time they balk at cuts in specific programs which they favor. If politicians "hedge" their stands on issues, so does the American electorate. This is additional proof of the widespread applicability of Ralph Waldo Emerson's famous dictum, "Consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds."

Rarely, if ever, do a majority of officeholders and candidates adopt a position which is widely at variance with the current national consensus on some issue. Public opinion obviously does shift at times – as is demonstrated by weakening public support for the Vietnam War as it dragged on without a successful resolution – but nevertheless on balance it tends to hover around the middle of the political spectrum. Clearly Ronald Reagan is more conservative than the electorate which twice elected him President, and this is especially true of social issues, despite widespread Moral Majority support of his candidacy in both 1980 and 1984.

This research into campaign literature from the election of 1982, moreover, offers additional proof of the validity of a theory set forth by political scientist Theodore Lowi in his article, "The Artificial Majority," which appeared in the *Nation* on December 7, 1970.(9) Here Lowi observed: "Centricity prevails, first of all, because the candidates give the voters no choice but centricity. Even if the polls did not tilt the responses in favor of moderation, the candidate would." To Lowi many candidates are guilty of "strategic obfuscation": "they define the issues in terms so general that each candidate can virtually subsume the other." What held true in 1970, moreover, also

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held true in 1982, as we have seen. If some potential voters stay away from the ballot box on the grounds that they see little, if any, difference between the candidates,(10) from the ideological standpoint their perception may indeed be quite close to the truth.

FOOTNOTES

(1) George Skelton, "It's a deat heat in parties' race to gain support," in Dallas *Times Herald*, October 1, 1987, pp. 1 and 14. The quote appears on the latter page.

(2) See the author's *A Guide to Political Platforms* (Hamden: Shoe String Press, Archon Books, 1977), p. 373.

(3) Consult the author's "Beyond the Rhetoric: A New Look at Presidential Inaugural Addresses," in *Presidential Studies Quarterly* X:4 (Fall 1980), pp. 571-87.

(4) Some of the records of the Republican National Committee and the Democratic National Committee are available to researchers at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and at several Presidential libraries, but the more sensitive material never reaches these depositories.

(5) In a separate article currently in preparation dealing with these House contests the author is investigating the "all politics is local" hypothesis. He has discovered through an examination of the campaign literature of incumbents that only 38 per cent of sitting Representatives mention constituent services, only 19 per cent pork barrel legislation.

(6) Because of its proximity to Fidel Castro's Cuba, Florida obviously has an unusually strong interest in that island. Such Southern states as Texas also are highly concerned about developments involving Mexico, especially illegal aliens.

(7) Twenty-four years earlier, in 1958, circumstances were somewhat different in the mid-term election held that year. After General Dwight Eisenhower had become President in 1953, he had implemented a "New Look" in defense policy which favored nuclear weapons over conventional military forces. As a result, the Democrats began attacking the Republicans for being weak on defense.

(8) An exception was Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, who issued a 59 page monograph, *The Moynihan Record: Legislative Highlights*, during the 1982 campaign. One only wonders how many New Yorkers who either voted for, or against, Senator Moynihan actually read this document.

(9) See pp. 591-4.

(10) During recent years voter turnout in these off-year contests statistically has been on the decline. The peak turnout in mid-term elections reached a total in excess of 45 per cent in both 1962 and 1966. By 1978, though, the mid-term turnout had fallen 11 percentage points to 34 per cent, the worst rate of participation since the wartime election of 1942. The dropoff of 8 points between 1970 and 1974 was the biggest change in either an upwards or downwards direction in either a Presidential contest or a mid-term election during the postwar era.

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CALIFORNIA WELFARE EXPENDITURES

By Robert G. Mogull

Earlier efforts by Mogull have analyzed the factors determining the level of welfare expenditures in the United States at the federal level, by the aggregate of states, and by the national aggregate of local jurisdictions.(1) In those previous studies, models of various forms were applied with generally high levels of success. No study has yet attempted an explanation of the welfare function at the level of an individual state, and the purpose of this study is to "explain" expenditures for public welfare which have been made by the State of California over the past quarter century.

Public welfare expenditures are an appropriation category of major dimension for the State of California. Total outlays for welfare by the State have risen from $429 million in 1959 to over $10 billion in 1984, when valued at current dollars. (See Figure 1.) In 1984, California ranked sixth among all states in per capita expenditures for public welfare(2) and first in total welfare appropriations.(3) Welfare programs accounted for 22.6% of the State's entire outlays for that year.(4)

Given an annual outlay of such magnitude, it would be worthwhile to develop an understanding and an explanation of the forces which govern these expenditures. Relating outlays to their explanatory factors will provide insight and permit the prediction, planning, and more effective control of appropriations.

One goal of this study is to disentangle, "explain," and measure the impact of the primary determinants of public welfare expenditures operating within the State over time. Lessons learned from an analysis of the welfare function for California may be either of immediate or of potential relevance to other states and jurisdictions. The second goal is to test and refine a statistical device for the purposes mentioned above, which may be emulated for other expenditure functions and by other jurisdictions.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

The first of three studies by Mogull on antipoverty expenditures considered the time period between 1957 and 1972, and

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

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aggregated national data for state and local jurisdictions.(5) Among the more prominent results and conclusions, it was found that average state and local real public welfare expenditures per poor person peaked in the early 1960s and declined steadily thereafter. Furthermore, differences among states in average outlays for this function were large and growing. The decline in appropriations per recipient was attributed both to a change either in public attitude or in priorities and to an intentional shifting of the burden to the federal level. However, as the central government assumed greater responsibility for welfare, the real level of aid grew substantially.

When a comparison was made among the explanatory factors of welfare expenditures, fiscal resources of state and local jurisdictions and federal grants-in-aid were typically dominant. However, outside grants exhibited a tendency to dissipate in impact over time. Hence, it is becoming more difficult for the federal government to stimulate and induce expenditures for welfare at lower jurisdictional levels.

As revealed by cross-sectional evidence and by first-differences in the cross-sectional data, outlays for the poor were least influenced by the needs of the poor for assistance. There was a clear trend by state and local jurisdictions to be less prompted in welfare appropriations by needs. Among the suggested causes of this trend were the increasing dollar amounts spent for welfare, the expansion of the welfare caseload, an implicit lid on expenditures for relief, and a desire to repel the needy from the community.

In a second study by Mogull, expenditures for public welfare were contrasted among federal, state, and local jurisdictions.(6) The span of time analyzed was the years 1959 through 1976, and the multivariate models were structured in a manner roughly similar to the first study. In the initial study, whereas changes over time were estimated by using first-differences between four discrete dates, the second study employed time-series data. Also, this study used double-logarithmic regression models to estimate coefficients for elasticity. There were significant differences in the statistical results obtained at each jurisdictional level. Hence, conclusions could not be generalized to encompass all jurisdictions.

At every level, more and more resources were being diverted to alleviate poverty. Among states over the period considered,

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real welfare appropriations per poor person rose by 536%. This was almost four times the increase at local levels, but only about half as great as the increase at the federal level. As the federal share of total welfare outlays expanded, the states' share of the total declined from 37% to 27%.

The principal conclusions derived from the aggregate of states were that: (a) the linear trend factor was dominant in "explaining" the expenditure variable, thus possibly reflecting the stability of an incremental budgeting process. However, log welfare expenditures were related inversely and inelastically to time. (b) Grants-in-aid were next in power influencing allocations for welfare, although their impact was also inelastic. The inelastic response suggests substantial resistance to expanding the welfare programs at state levels. (c) Particularly notable was the loose, inverse, and inelastic relationships between welfare appropriations and the needs of the poor for assistance. As in the initial study, needs served as an unreliable determinant of welfare expenditures.

The final study of the trio compared and "explained" public welfare appropriations at the federal, state, local, state plus local, and for the combination of all levels. (7) The time period analyzed was 1959 through 1977. Both linear and double-log curvilinear models were employed, although the curvilinear results were consistently superior. As before, the dependent variable was public welfare expenditures per poor person in dollars of constant purchasing power.

A weak and inverse relationship was found between needs for assistance and subsequent welfare expenditures by states. Whereas states tended to be insensitive, they were more responsive than local governments. Needs of the poor was much inferior to the fiscal ability of a jurisdiction in accounting for welfare outlays. It was surmised that as needs increase and as the total welfare budget expands, states dilute their limited allocations and spend less per poor resident.

Federal grants evoked a positive yet inelastic response from states. On the average, a one percent increase in categorical grants elicited only a .3 percent increase in state welfare expenditures. Hence, there was strong resistance to any further growth in welfare appropriations at the state (and local) level(s). Welfare became more and more a function of the central government.

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In gauging the association between welfare expenditures and tax effort, the relationship was greatest at the local level and most loose at the federal level, with states lying midway. Lower levels were reasoned to possess a greater sensitivity to programs which involve substantial outlays, a more heightened awareness of the costs of welfare. At the local level, sources of revenue are more limited and there is also greater mobility among taxpayers to escape oppressive tax burdens. These elements contributed to the more frugal response of welfare outlays by lower jurisdictions.

At all levels, the net impact of time upon real welfare appropriations per poor person was inverse. Therefore, there was a growing inclination to spend less for each poor resident. This may be attributable to the social turbulence of the 1960s and to a subsequent backlash. However, there also may have been an illusion among taxpayers of being overwhelmed by the fiscal burden of expanding social welfare programs.

Thus, although real public welfare expenditures per poor person had risen greatly over the 19 year time period considered, the increase was attributed primarily to an increased ability by jurisdictions to afford the outlays. This is particularly true at the federal level which has the most substantial tax base, the least danger of flight by taxpayers, and the least direct accountability for additional outlays.

Summary

The evidence and conclusions reached from the trilogy of previous research can be summarized and unified. The studies examined roughly overlapping time frames of from 1957 through 1977. They used consecutively cross-sectional data, first-differences in cross-sectional data, and time-series information. Each study attempted to explain variations in public welfare expenditures per poor person in dollars of constant purchasing power. The foci of the analyses were the federal, state, local, state plus local, and combination of all three jurisdictional levels. Structural characteristics of the multivariate models were similar, with some modifications.

There was general consistency in overall results, although the behavior of local jurisdictions was least predictable. The ability to afford expenditures, with internal and/or external resources, was the dominant explanatory characteristic. The more local

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the jurisdiction, the tighter the relationship between welfare outlays and tax revenues. Or, the more remote the dispensing authority, the weaker the relationship between the tax burden and subsequent appropriations. Needs of the poor for assistance was low, diminishing, and typically inverse in impact at both state and local levels. The more immediate the jurisdiction, the less the response to poverty needs. Federal grants were growing less effective at stimulating and inducing welfare appropriations by lower levels. And, at all jurisdictional levels, there was a social drift to reduce the commitment to the need. Lower levels attempted to shift upwards the financial burden of welfare. As the federal government assumed a larger role, there was greater responsiveness to needs and a concurrent increase in real outlays per poor person from all levels combined.

VARIABLES

Dependent Variable

Expenditures

The goal of this study is to explain variations in real per poor person expenditures for public welfare which have been made by the State of California annually between 1959 and 1984. Appropriations for public welfare are both direct and intergovernmental. They consist primarily of categorical assistance and of direct payments to vendors for medical care of the needy. Payments for categorical assistance are comprised of those for old age, aid to families with dependent children, aid to the blind, and aid to the disabled. This group of programs, commonly referred to as welfare, will be statistically explained.

The expenditures variable is computed net of outside grants-in-aid which are designed for this function. Intergovernmental revenues to the State for public welfare come primarily from the federal government, but also come from local jurisdictions (that is, from counties) within the State. Although the overwhelming portion is received from the central government, between 1967 and 1978, revenues from intrastate were substantial. Intrastate aid to Sacramento peaked in 1978 at around $.6 billion (out of a State total welfare budget of $6.2 billion). Since the objective of the study is to explain welfare outlays which originate from Sacramento alone, outside aid from all sources are deducted from total appropriations to create net or pure State expenditures.

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Welfare appropriations, as is true for all money variables in this study, are adjusted for inflation by using the California Consumer Price Index for Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, with 1967 as the base year. Thus, all monetary variables are expressed in real dollars or in dollars of constant purchasing power.

The dependent variable, henceforth denoted as "W," is expressed per poor person. In other words, the objective is to explain temporal variations in real net public welfare outlays between 1959 and 1984 which were spent for each poor resident of the State.

Independent Variables

Needs of the Poor

One dimension to explaining expenditures for public welfare is presumed to be the needs of the poor for assistance. As needs become evident, State administrative and legislative branches are expected to respond with compassion.

Needs of the poor for assistance are represented by the percentage of the population within the State of California which falls beneath official poverty thresholds. The threshold for poverty is a sliding scale, using a variable index originally developed in 1964 by the Social Security Administration. The index is based upon the cost of a low-income nutritionally adequate food plan (an "Economy Food Plan") designed in 1961 by the Department of Agriculture. Revised by Federal Interagency Committees in 1969 and 1980, the index of poverty is determined solely by money income. It reflects the different consumption requirements of families, depending upon their size and composition. Poverty thresholds are adjusted annually for changes in the cost of living, using the Consumer Price Index.

The U.S. Bureau of Census computes annual indexes for the nation on cut-off levels for poverty, and on the number of persons and the percentage of the population which are defined as poor. Although the Census Bureau does not prepare annual estimates of poverty for individual states, the Bureau has made four estimates specifically for the State of California. Given the four official points of estimation, distributions may be interpolated and extrapolated both for the number and the percentage of poor people residing within California annually from

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FIGURE 2.

INCIDENCE OF POVERTY IN CALIFORNIA
1959 - 1984



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1959 through 1984.(8) When plotted, Censuses' data points are found to follow a parabolic pattern over time. Therefore, a quadratic regression of the form $Y = f(X,X^2)$ is computed and employed to estimate the percentage of the population which is poor (Y) over the prescribed interval, based upon annual State population figures (X). Figure 2 illustrates the path of the percentage of residents within the State of California that are estimated to live in poverty over the assigned time frame.

Annual estimates of the percentage of residents that are poor serve as an indication of the needs dimension. The needs factor reflects the pervasiveness of poverty but not its severity. However, the extent of poverty is presumed to also serve as an adequate proxy for its severity. Thus, the needs variable represents both qualitative (severity) as well as quantitative extent characteristics.

Apart from serving as the numerator of the independent proxy for needs, the number of poor residents also serves as the denominator for two other variables in the model – including the previously discussed dependent variable ("W").

In conclusion, the first independent factor to be included in the multivariate model represents the needs of the poor for assistance. Symbolically expressed as "P," this variable is the percentage of the civilian population of California with income below the poverty threshold. Whereas the null hypothesis claims the absence of a true partial connection between needs and expenditures, it is expected that the statistical impact will be significant.

Fiscal Strength

Previous studies have demonstrated the importance of jurisdictional resources in accounting for public welfare appropriations. Financial resources have been shown to be a principal and a reliable determinant of expenditures. On the basis of previous evidence, the relationship in this study is expected to also appear as positive, strong, and close. Nevertheless, the State of California has its own particular pattern of response between welfare expenditures and fiscal strength.

The ability of taxpayers within the State of California to afford outlays for welfare is represented by per capita real personal income. This variable is symbolically expressed as "I."

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Outside Aid

Intergovernmental revenues received by the State are another component of the fiscal resources dimension. The State of California, as do other states, receives categorical grants-in-aid from the federal government which are tied by formula to its expenditures for public welfare. The intent of the central government is to encourage State welfare outlays through both an income and a price effect. The income effect increases the overall ability of the State to afford appropriations. The price effect operates when grants are earmarked to be used for one purpose rather than for another. Hence, the dollar cost of the supported activity is reduced relative to the cost of alternative State activities.

For brief periods, local governments within the State of California shared in the financial support of State administered programs for public welfare. All intragovernmental revenues received by the State from lower levels for the welfare program were funds provided by counties as a contributory share of the expense of medical assistance for the needy. By 1979 local (that is, county) intragovernmental revenues were largely terminated, and in 1984 shared intrastate revenues for welfare were zero.

In the model, intergovernmental aid which is earmarked specifically for public welfare functions and which is received by the State of California from both federal and local levels, is expressed in dollars of constant purchasing power and per poor resident. This independent dimension is symbolically represented by "G." Its impact upon the dependent variable (that is, on "W") is expected to be direct, strong, and statistically significant.

Aside from representing a separate and independent component of the fiscal ability of the State to afford assistance, welfare revenues from external jurisdictions are also deducted from State total welfare expenditures. This creates a dependent expenditure variable ("W") which is entirely self-financed from State revenues.

Willingness to Help

The ability of the State to help the needy is one dimension. But, a willingness to provide for the poor with available

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resources is quite another. Willingness to help is an explicit expression of public support, concern, compasion, or task to assist the less affluent. The percentage of personal income which is devoted to paying State taxes (that is, the average burden of State taxes upon individuals) is represented by "R." A willingness to spend public welfare can be gauged by the partial relationship between dependent variable "W" and independent factor "R." The impact of "R" upon "W" is a measure of the humane and tangible intent of taxpayers to help the needy.

Political Climate

The political scene is believed to have an independent role in determining State fiscal behavior. As a modern phenomenon, Democrats are regarded as being more sensitive than Republicans to the plight of the needy. To measure a political or philosophical point of view, an independent variable consists of the percentage of the State Assembly which is controlled by Democrats. This factor is symbolized by "D." The relationship between welfare appropriations ("W") and "D" is expected to be direct and close.

Trend

Trend is a structural term within the model to account for other systematic factors which are associated with time. As a separate independent factor, time can account for the association between the dependent variable and any remaining systematic components not explicitly identified. Thus, it is a term to represent residual systematic effects. Symbolically expressed by "T," it takes the values 1 through 26 for each year that is encompassed by the study.

Among the presumed major components of the trend factor are social customs, an historical context or perspective, and the continuity of the State budgetary process. This last element predicts that previous levels of spending help to determine current levels, or that expenditure levels self-generate over time.

A principal element of the trend variable is social sentiment, which blends a variety of currents. The currents are carried by diverse segments of the population. They can work in opposition to one another or in accord, and they can ebb and flow. Nevertheless, a collective social sentiment usually emerges at discrete time intervals. These collective sentiments are heroically represented by a single time gauge, "T."

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MODEL

To estimate the relationships, the basic multivariate statistical model has the form:

$$W_t = a + b_1P_t + b_2I_t + b_3G_t + b_4R_t + b_5D_t + b_6T_t + e_t$$

where

W = public welfare expenditures per poor person, net of outside grants, in dollars of constant purchasing power.

P = percentage of the population with income below poverty thresholds--the needs dimension.

I = per capita personal income in dollars of constant purchasing power--the affordability or fiscal strength dimension.

G = total categorical grants-in-aid received from external jurisdictions which are earmarked for State administered public welfare programs, per poor person, in dollars of constant purchasing power--the second component of the affordability dimension.

R = percentage of per capita real personal income devoted to the payment of State real taxes--the burden of State taxes and willingness-to-help dimension.

D = percentage of the State Assembly which consists of members of the Democratic Party--the political dimension.

T = a trend factor to account for other systematic influences that follow a time-related pattern--the social and historical dimension.

e = residual term for the unexplained deviation between the dependent and complete set of independent variables.

t = term subscript to identify the year of observation.

METHODOLOGY

Multiple regressions are run using four versions of the basic model. The four versions are as follows:

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(1) A linear relationship composed of main effects.

$$\hat{W}_t = a + b_1P_t + b_2I_t + b_3G_t + b_4R_t + b_5D_t + b_6T_t$$

(2) A double-logarithmic relationship consisting of main effects.

$$\widehat{\log W}_t = a + b_1 \log P_t + b_2 \log I_t + b_3 \log G_t + b_4 \log R_t + b_5 \log D_t + b_6 \log T_t$$

(3) A linear relationship with main effects and with interactions among only the independent variables.

$$\hat{W}_t = a + b_1P_t + b_2I_t + b_3G_t + b_4R_t + b_5D_t + b_6T_t + b_7TP_t + b_8TI_t + b_9TG_t + b_{10}TR_t + b_{11}TD_t$$

(4) A linear relationship with main effects and with interactions for both the dependent and independent factors.

$$\widehat{TW}_t = a + b_1P_t + b_2I_t + b_3G_t + b_4R_t + b_5D_t + b_6T_t + b_7TP_t + b_8TI_t + b_9TG_t + b_{10}TR_t + b_{11}TD_t$$

Beta weights are calculated in order to compare the relative power of the independent variables. Beta weights measure the impact by each independent variable upon the dependent variable free of distortions created by differing units of measurement. These unit-neutralized measures are obtained from the product of the partial regression coefficient and the ratio of the standard deviation of the independent variable to the standard deviation of the dependent variable.

Regression coefficients obtained by the double-log model are estimates of the percentage change of the dependent variable which is associated with a one-percent change by each independent variable. The regression coefficient of a double-log model is called an elasticity or a sensitivity coefficient.

Residuals from each regression model are tested for autocorrelation. The test is used to determine whether first-order sequential error terms are independent of one another, as is assumed. If the independence assumption is judged to be invalid, there are serious interpretive consequences. The presence of autocorrelation can cause erroneous inferences regarding the systematic relationship between the dependent variable and each independent factor.

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The null hypothesis concerning each exogenous term is that there is no true systematic relationship between the dependent variable and a particular independent factor. It is common practice to test the regression coefficients with alpha levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. These levels indicate the probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis. Hence, results which are statistically significant at the 1% level, for example, are superior to results which are significant at the 10% level.

In this study, however, alpha levels as high as 25% are employed to test the statistical significance of the partial regression coefficients. There are two reasons for this unorthodox procedure. First, the use of alpha levels up to a maximum of 10% is simply a convention, custom, or tradition. There is no inherent reason or justification by the models, variables, or nature of the study which require this constraint. Second, although rejection of the null hypothesis at a low alpha level would yield a high level of confidence in reaching a conclusion, it is the author's contention that confidence levels in this type of research are sufficiently high at around 75%. Admittedly, this level is also arbitrary.

Furthermore, it should be clarified as to precisely what is to be tested and concluded here. Suppose that a partial regression coefficient is found to be statistically significant. A true systematic relationship between variables is then inferred for the universe. But what is the universe in this study? Is the universe all 50 states? The answer is *no*. California was not selected at random from among the 50 states as a sample of one. If that were the case, then any conclusions drawn from the evidence could be justifiably generalized to all states. But that is not the case since the State of California was intentionally selected for analysis.

Then perhaps the data represents a random segment of time for which the State of California made public welfare expenditures. Again this is incorrect. The span of time which was chosen for examination was not selected randomly. Other time spans are not selected for analysis because comparable data are not available for any other years. All time periods with appropriate data are purposefully included in the study. The sample of years is fixed and is not randomly chosen.

Thus, no generalization or inference may be applied either to other states in the nation or to a universe of other time spans.

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What, then, is accomplished by testing the statistical significance of the partial regression coefficients and that of the complete model? The correct motivation here for testing significance is simply to ascertain whether tight relationships exist. When a coefficient is found to be statistically significant, it is interpreted in this study to mean that the assocation between variables is tight or close. And, this interpretation of tests of significance is another justification for permitting alpha to rise above the conventional levels.

EVIDENCE

Results from each model are presented below — consisting of the intercept and partial regression coefficients, standard error of each regression coefficient, levels of statistical significance, beta weights, rankings of the beta weights, the standard error of estimate, the coefficient of multiple determination (adjusted and unadjusted for degrees of freedom), the F test statistic, and the Durbin-Watson (DW) test statistic.

(1) The linear model with main effects produces the following results:

$\hat{W}$ = -431 + .71P + .06I - .03G + 103R[a] - 2.8D[c] + 10.1T[b]

S.E.	(17)	(.12)	(.13)	(43)	(2.1)	(7.1)
β	.004	.149	.038	.491	.088	.398
β Rank	6	3	5	1	4	2

a = significant at .05 level.

b = significant at .20 level.

c = significant at .25 level.

S.E. of Estimate = 58

$\hat{R}^2$ = 91%

R^2 = 93.2% is significant at least at the .1% level.

F = 43

DW = 1.38, which lies in the inconclusive range.

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(2) The basic model with variables in logarithmic form achieves the following results:

$$\widehat{\log W} = -5.82 + .11 \log P + 2.15 \log I^{b} + .08 \log G$$

S.E.	(.70)	(1.03)	(.18)
β	.017	.471	.087
β Rank	6	1	4

$$+ 1.30 \log R^{a} - .49 \log D^{c} + .11 \log T$$

S.E.	(.53)	(.30)	(.10)
β	.325	.081	.153
β Rank	2	5	3

a = significant at the .025 level.

b = significant at the .10 level.

c = significant at the .20 level.

S.E. of Estimate = .05

$\hat{R}^2$ = 96.2%

R^2 = 97.1% is significant at least at the .1% level.

F = 105

DW = 1.53, which lies in the inconclusive range.

(3) As well as measuring the impact of main effects, the third model also evaluates the joint impact of time ("T") combined with other independent variables. The following results are obtained:

$$\hat{W} = 1063 - 60.4P^{d} + .17I - 1.15G^{b} - 103R^{d} + .53D + 55T$$

S.E.	(47.0)	(.28)	(.65)	(79)	(6.52)	(62)
β	.356	.461	1.353	.492	.017	2.185
β Rank	10	8	6	7	11	4

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	$-5.09TP^{a}$	$+ .002TI$	$+ .07TG^{c}$	$+ 9.47TR^{c}$	$- 1.14TD^{a}$
S.E.	(2.32)	(.013)	(.04)	(5.47)	(.50)
β	2.456	.435	1.747	2.828	2.911
β Rank	3	9	5	2	1

a = significant at the .05 level.

b = significant at the .10 level.

c = significant at the .20 level.

d = significant at the .25 level.

S.E. of Estimate = 39

$\hat{R}^2$ = 95.9%

R^2 = 97.7% is significant at least at the .1% level.

F = 55

DW = 2.30, which lies in the inconclusive range.

(4) The final model accounts for interactions on both sides of the equation. Its results are as follows:

$\hat{TW}$ = 23730	$- 1218P^{d}$	$+ 3.18I$	$- 32.6G^{a}$	$- 2932R^{c}$	$+ 36.1D$	$+ 1094T$
S.E.	(861)	(5.10)	(11.9)	(1443)	(120)	(1130)
β	.255	.302	1.365	.499	.040	1.535
β Rank	10	8	6	7	11	5

$- 93.8TP^{b}$	$+ .04TI$	$+ 1.84TG^{b}$	$+ 236TR^{b}$	$- 26.2TD^{a}$
S.E.	(42.6)	(.24)	(.79)	(100)	(9.2)
β	1.611	.287	1.710	2.512	2.384
β Rank	4	9	3	1	2

a = significant at the .02 level.

b = significant at the .05 level.

c = significant at the .10 level.

d = significant at the .20 level.

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S.E. of Estimate = 718

$\hat{R}^2$ = 98.3%

R^2 = 99% is significant at least at the .1% level.

F = 130

DW = 2.21, which lies in the inconclusive range.

ANALYSIS

The least effective of the four models explains over 93% of the variation of the dependent variable, while the most effective model accounts for 99% of the variation. No model shows evidence of autocorrelation among the regression residuals. All Durbin-Watson test statistics fall within the indeterminate range, as is likely to occur when the number of explanatory variables is large. Clear patterns of individual relationships emerge from a comprehensive examination of the results obtained from all four models.

The equation with interactions on both sides produces a very tight overall data fit and yields many close partial relationships. The model exhibits an R^2 = 99% and an adjusted $\hat{R}^2$ = 98.3%. The F-ratio of 130 indicates that 130 times more variance of "TW" is explained than remains unexplained. Thus, the interactive model accounts for virtually all of the variation of combinations of time and real welfare expenditures per poor person. By measuring the interaction of the expenditure and time variables, welfare appropriations are placed in an historical setting or context.

One is the tightest and strongest partial relationships in the model involves the interactive explanatory variable for political dominance, "TD," where its association with "TW" is inverse. An increase in combinations of time and Democratic influence within the State Assembly is closely and powerfully associated with a decrease in combinations of time and State welfare appropriations. This inverse relationship appears within all models. In the two interactive models where the relationship between welfare expenditures and main effect Democrats ("D") is positive, the impact by "D" alone is weak and loose. However, all four inverse relationships are statistically significant.

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Hence, the average poor resident receives more assistance with greater Republican control of the State Assembly. This outcome was not anticipated.

Another close partial relationship is between dependent variable "TW" and main effect "G," where "G" represents shared revenues which originate from outside of Sacramento. The association between the dependent variable and "G" is inverse in three of the four regression models. Yet, the relationships between dependent variables "W" and "TW" with interactive "TG" is close, strong, and direct. Thus, by itself, higher levels of outside aid to Sacramento ("G") cause smaller expenditures for public welfare per poor person. This is probably a consequence of the federal formula for matching grants, which encourages wide dissemination of the funds among the needy rather than high outlays per poor person. However, since the association between the interactive explanatory term "TG" and both dependent variables "TW" and "W" is direct, larger combinations of time and outside grants result in higher welfare expenditures per poor resident. In historical context, both outside grants for welfare ("TG") and State outlays for welfare are closely associated. The State of California apparently ties any increases in per poor person appropriations for this function to increases in per poor person federal aid. And, judging from the double-log model where the coefficient for "log G" is low (but positive), categorical grants have both a weak and an inelastic impact on State welfare appropriations ("log W"). In summary, higher levels of outside grants are diluted among a growing number of recipients and cause a contraction of State allocations per needy resident. Yet, as time and grants jointly rise, so do appropriations per poor person – and this relationship is close. Sacramento does respond to more outside funds but inelastically.

Evidence from both interaction models show a tight inverse relationship between "R" and the dependent variable. As the burden of State taxes rises, per poor person real outlays decrease. The growing burden of taxes has a strong negative impact on the willingness of taxpayers to permit higher welfare payments. However, a close, strong, and positive association is revealed between "TR" and its dependent variables. Hence, State welfare appropriations are powerfully influenced in the same direction by joint changes in the tax burden and time.

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Whereas the tax burden ("R") depresses appropriations, the joint impact of time and taxes ("TR") on expenditures is positive. Public welfare outlays per poor person rise along with joint increases of time and taxes.

In the two interactive models, all terms which involve needs hold a significant inverse association with the dependent variable. Whether in combination with levels of time ("TP") or by itself ("P"), the greater the percentage of the populatation in California that is needy, the smaller the appropriation per poor person. It may be that as the number of needy persons increase, the State simply distributes its fixed allocation over more recipients. But also, lawmakers may be intimidated by the number of poor people and by welfare spending as they both continue to rise. Legislators would, therefore, tend to place a lid on further increases in welfare appropriations. (In the other two models, although the relationships between welfare expenditures and needs are direct, they are loose and weak.)

A further interesting outcome is the loose relationship between income per capita (representing the ability of taxpayers to afford outlays) and welfare appropriations. "I" and "TI" consistently retain the anticipated direct relationship with the dependent variable, but they are unexpectedly weak in "explaining" welfare expenditures. This result appears in all linear models. However, although the relationship in the double-log model between "log I" and "log W" is also direct, it is close, very strong, and highly elastic. Thus, whereas the affordability of welfare outlays is not a primary determinant of State expenditures, the percentage change in appropriations is closely and powerfully tied to the percentage change in the ability of taxpayers to afford additional outlays. Welfare appropriations per poor person go nowhere unless State incomes also rise. Percentage increases in both factors are closely and strongly tied to one another.

For all equations, trend ("T") holds a direct relationship with per poor person real welfare expenditures. But, in only the linear main-effects model is the relationship strong and somewhat tight. Thus, the tendency is for State real welfare outlays per poor person to gradually rise. Since "T," by itself, serves as a proxy primarily for social sentiment, it appears that the public is willing to appropriate more per recipient at the State level, but certainly not dramatically more and not consistently

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or routinely. In fact, although total real welfare expenditures peaked in 1982, per poor person outlays peaked earlier in 1978. And by 1984, real outlays per recipient had fallen to pre-1970 levels. Other observors have similarly found a growing "harsh tone of current American attitudes toward the poor. [This attitude takes] the view that an undeserving underclass is developing . . . . [Consequently, it is] more and more difficult to sell antipoverty policy to the electorate."(9)

SUMMARY

This study is designed to build and expand upon information obtained from earlier research efforts by the author. In previous studies, a variety of statistical models were tried. The focus of analysis was the behavior alternately of the federal government, the aggregate of states, the aggregate of SMSA's, and combinations of jurisdictional levels. In preceding studies as well as in the present one, the objective has been to "explain" public welfare expenditures per poor person in dollars of constant purchasing power. The unique aspect of this inquiry is that the focus is upon a single lower level jurisdiction — the State of California. Furthermore, several models are employed, including those to measure the interaction between trend and other factors. The time frame for examination is 1959 through 1984, a span of 26 years. A significant additional feature of the study are annual estimates of the number of residents in California with income below poverty thresholds.

Each of the four regression models used here produces a very tight data fit, and in several cases the overall fit is nearly perfect. Many of the partial relationships are also close. Beta weights have been computed in order to discern the relative power of the independent variables, free of distortions caused by differing units of measurement. There is no evidence in any model of autocorrelation among the regression residuals. Thus, the set of models is highly successful in accounting for temporal variations in public welfare appropriations by the State of California over the past quarter century. A similar methodology may be applied to other expenditure functions within the State, as well as to the appropriation behavior of jurisdictions elsewhere.

Among the most prominent results are the following. 1) Surprisingly, Democrats in the State Assembly are less effective

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than Republicans in promoting welfare appropriations per poor recipient. 2) Despite the increase in categorical grants to California, per poor person welfare disbursements by the State are declining. Grants-in-aid have a weak and inelastic impact on State welfare expenditures. There is an apparent effort to shift the responsibility for any increase in per recipient welfare payments to the federal government. 3) State taxpayers are grudgingly providing additional funds for public assistance. But as the financial burden of welfare increases, the willingness of taxpayers to help the needy is waning. 4) Concurrent with growth in the number and the percentage of poor people, State allocations per recipient are shrinking. This is a reflection of the dilution of available funds and is also a consequence of the intimidating size of the overall welfare program. The response by the State to changes in the proportion of needy residents is highly inelastic. 5) The ability of taxpayers within California to afford public assistance only loosely "explains" welfare expenditures per poor person. Yet, for a given percentage change in the ability of the State to spend, there is a strong and highly elastic expenditure response. Any percentage increase in welfare appropriations per poor person is tied closely to the percentage increase in State income. 6) There is a gradual trend to raise per poor person welfare spending. But, the drift is weak and very gradual.

In conclusion, the average poor person in California can expect no drastic change in State support in the near future. The public is becoming only slightly and sporadically more sympathetic over time. Moreover, the State of California does not appear to be stimulated by federal efforts. It may be surmised that taxpayers in California would strongly prefer to let the federal government handle any increase in the support of the needy, if not assume responsibility for the entire program. In the short run, the poor would be better served by electing more Republicans to the State Assembly. Further, as the State grows more prosperous, the needy can expect strong incremental support. However, the effect of any increase in the percentage poor would be to dilute available funds. If the burden of State taxes were to rise substantially, all bets are off as to any improvement in public support of the needy.

In brief, aside from electing more Republicans to the Assembly, the poor would be best served by an expanding economic

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THE POOR OF CALIFORNIA, 1959 THROUGH 1984

Year	Official % Poor[a]	Estimated % Poor[b]	Official Number Poor[a]	Estimated Number Poor[b]
1959	14.4	14.4	2,199,376	2,206,929
1960		13.7		2,166,873
1961		13.0		2,133,553
1962		12.4		2,110,091
1963		11.9		2,091,894
1964		11.5		2,079,293
1965		11.2		2,076,100
1966		11.1		2,083,278
1967		10.9		2,089,523
1968		10.8		2,097,131
1969	11.1	10.7	2,152,716	2,109,562
1970		10.6		2,123,949
1971		10.5		2,143,039
1972		10.5		2,161,694
1973		10.5		2,188,209
1974		10.5		2,221,712
1975	10.4	10.5	2,192,170	2,268,628
1976		10.6		2,328,635
1977		10.7		2,401,469
1978		11.0		2,501,471
1979	11.4	11.2	2,626,183	2,598,991
1980		11.5		2,736,578
1981		11.8		2,869,511
1982		12.3		3,026,074
1983		12.7		3,203,988
1984		13.2		3,385,106

[a]Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Decennial Censuses for 1960, 1970, and 1980; and the 1976 Survey of Income and Education.

[b]Whenever estimates by the Bureau of the Census are available, the official figures are used in this study. Thus, they are substituted for my estimates in 1959, 1969, 1975, and 1979.

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pie and by a federal takeover of the entire public welfare program. An attempt to obtain a bigger piece of a stagnant pie will, in all likelihood, be unsuccessful. The worst possible scenario for the average poor person would be growth in their percentage, greater Democratic control of the State Assembly, an increasing burden of State taxes, curtailment of the federal grants-in-aid program, and a stagnant State economy.

FOOTNOTES

(1) Mogull, Robert G., "Jurisdictional Spending for Public Welfare," *Journal of Regional Science*, XXI (1981), No. 3, 403-410; Mogull, Robert G., "Public Welfare Expenditures Explained and Compared on Three Jurisdictional Levels," *Western Tax Review*, II (Fall 1981), No. 2, 94-115; Mogull, Robert G., "State and Local Anti-poverty Expenditures," *Public Finance Quarterly*, VI (July 1978), No. 3, 287-303.

(2) U.S. Bureau of the Census, *State Government Finance in 1984*, Series GF84, No. 3, October 1985, p. 53.

(3) *State Government Finance in 1984*, p. 26.

(4) *State Government Finance in 1984*, pp. 20, 19.

(5) *Public Finance Quarterly.*

(6) *Western Tax Review.*

(7) *Journal of Regional Science.*

(8) See the Appendix for a listing of the percentage of the population and the number of persons that are estimated to live in poverty within the State of California annually from 1959 to 1984.

(9) An observation expressed by James T. Patterson in "Antipoverty Policy: Past and Future," *Focus*, VIII (Summer 1985), No. 2, p. 23.

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PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR: IS WESTERN STRATEGY CHANGING AGAIN?

By C. W. Borklund

When he was the Pentagon's Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, Dr. Richard LeLauer noted, "Nuclear weapons are great defense and lousy offense."(1) If published predictions are accurate, the United States and the Soviet Union may be signing, and offering to the United States Senate for approval in early-to-mid-1988, an Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) treaty, agreeing that both sides will remove from central Europe all nuclear-warhead missiles with a range of up to 500 nautical miles or so.

Meanwhile, through the stratagem of tacking the mandates onto some Bill whose main purpose they think the President cannot veto (a Defense funding resolution most likely), certain Members of Congress are attempting to force his compliance with what is termed "a strict interpretation" of the 1974 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) protocol to the 1972 SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) and his compliance with the arms-limitation provisions of the SALT II treaty. If advocates of these strictures overcome White House and Pentagon opposition, the effect of the first will be to limit severely the Pentagon's ability to perform proof-tests of many of the theoretically most important components of Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) against attacking nuclear warheads.

The irony of the second scheme is that it would impose on the United States unilaterally a treaty the Senate refused to ratify in 1980. Such results disturb Pentagon military planners a great deal, not only on their own merits but also because of another related – as they see it – trend. Since 1985, a majority of Congress has voted sharp curtailments in President Reagan's Defense spending plans without, as Senate Armed Services Committee member Dan Quayle (R-Ind.) has complained, "any analysis of the (Soviet) threat nor any meaningful debate over military strategy and ability to counter that threat."(2)

In short, preventing another World War II generally and nuclear war specifically, once a central political issue in the United States and Western Europe – and one which resulted

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in the creation of both the Department of Defense and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the late 1940s (with the concomitant faith of the creators that those kinds of organizations could hold to a minimum the costs of a modern-day requirement unique in the history of democracies, maintaining large, strong military forces in peacetime) is perceived by many observers to have fallen from the top of governmental priority lists.

The potential cumulative effect of all these possible mandates on military leadership are several, both short-term and long-term. On one hand, a sharp drop in support of Defense *now* becomes rather quickly reflected in the combat readiness of forces-in-being. (In the Pentagon, at least, budget cuts usually are accommodated first by reductions in manpower, operations and training, and equipment maintenance levels.)

On the other hand, as nearly every Secretary of Defense since the first one, James Forrestal in 1947, has recognized, whatever new weapon systems are authorized – or denied – now for development and deployment are what the operational forces will have – or not have – 15, 20 or more years from now. "We deal in futures," said Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., (in 1960): "And who knows? We may be right."(3)

Many, including the President's (Packard) Commission on Defense Management, have decried the "roller-coaster" performance of United States defense spending – down in 1977-79, sharply up from 1980 to 1984, sharply down the last three years – and the effect of that erratic cash flow on program stability, planning reliability, even world understanding of what United States war deterrence strategy is. And that strategy is, or at least is supposed to be, "the bottom line," as economists might say.

Regarding the latter, the proposed INF treaty, itself, is a case in point. In many respects, it has more significance at the moment as a political statement than as a military one, particularly in that aspect of the agreement where the Soviets appear to accept "thorough" on-site inspections by the Western Alliance, assuring, claims Secretary of State George Shultz among other, Soviet compliance with the treaty's missile-reduction provisions.

He well may be right when he argues that they would have no, presumeably military, reason "to cheat" because, in fact, they don't give up very much under INF – while at the political

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level some enthusiastic advocates of the treaty insist this is a giant step toward nuclear "peace in our time ." To understand what has been given up and what has been kept requires, probably, a brief re-cap of how this theoretical war between the Soviet bloc and the Western Alliance is most likely to develop, according to what has come to be accepted as the conventional wisdom among Pentagon strategic planners.

Interestingly enough, the opening attack is pretty well summarized in Tom Clancey's best-selling book, allegedly fiction, *Red Storm Rising.* (According to the Navy War College, which runs wargames all the time, in part as an advisory to the Chief of Naval Operations, above the only aspect of his book which is not entirely plausible is the name he's assigned to each principal character.) The scenario briefly summarized:

1. Exploiting its massively superior numbers of conventional forces, the Soviets launch a "blitzkrieg" at one or more relatively undermanned spots in Western Europe defenses coupled with an air interdiction, both to gain air supremacy and to cripple Western airpower's ability to break up Soviet reinforcements and leave the Soviet forward attackers isolated.

2. If Western forces are unable to blunt the Soviet attack, NATO, with a numerical inferiority of those forces at the start aanyway, resports to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, delivered by both aircraft and missiles, to hit those military targets; accomplish what their conventional forces have been unable to achieve. (Indeed, in the late 1960s and 1970s, the Pentagon was so sure a Soviet conventional attack would have to be answered with a NATO tactical nuclear attack that it provided U.S. forces in Europe with only enough war stocks to fight a conventional conflict for just six months – making their estimate of the war's likely progress a self-fulfilling prophesy.)

3. If the Western response appears to be turning the tide of battle, the Soviets would use their tactical nuclear weapons, including but not limited to SS-20 intermediate range missiles, to "blow a hole in Western defenses" and also hit major Western staging areas and reserves in France, the Benelux countries and Britain, most of which are near enough to major cities that the toll of civilian casualties likely would mount dramatically.

4. To deter the Soviets doing that, American strategic nuclear forces would, or at least could be, launched at the Soviet Union, itself, targetting there the same kinds of military targets the Soviets had hit in Western Europe.

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The deterrent point, in short: at each possible stage in a Soviet-Western Alliance nuclear escalation, the Soviets could not be assured, in advance, that it could attain, relatively and decisively, a clear military superiority over Western forces. And, of course, if none of that were to work out as planned, from the perspective of either side, at stage 4, both were looking at MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), i.e. the devastation of each other's cities.

Putting INF in that context, the Western Alliance has given up what would have been a major upgrade in the accuracy and potency of its nuclear counter, particularly at stage 2, by withdrawing the Pershing II and cruise missiles. (Little noted today is that it also unilaterally gave up what would have been another significant stage-2 capability when President Jimmy Carter, under pressure from so-called "Liberal" journalists and the MAD advocates, cancelled development of the neutron bomb. It would have been no less destructive of "things" than any other nuclear weapon but it would have assured what present tactical nuclear weapons cannot, i.e. that the tank crews as well as the tanks, for instance, would have been incapacitated.)

The Soviets, on the other hand, excepting the inspection agreement – which a prudent person would be advised to view with a wait-and-see attitude, given Soviet harrassment, and even assassination, of Allied inspectors during the last two years around Berlin – have given up only the latest addition to its nuclear ability to be affective at stage 3. INF, in other words, while it may not necessarily be a "giving away of the farm," as some of its opponents insist, may not be anywhere near the progress toward peace many of its advocates claim. If "news analysis" of the INF in the newspaper is any clue, the politics of desire is shewing what ought to be a debate over the evolutionary military military nuclear-deterrent requirement.

Certainly, an understanding of the 40-year evolution in nuclear-war deterrence strategy and consequent plans helps explain some of the more important nuances in the current pro-and-con debate over the merits of the SDI program. Though the SDI name is less than a decade old and much of the technology advance which some claim has made it do-able is not much older, the worth of such a defense against nuclear attack has been debated since the intercontinental ballistic missile

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(ICBM) became an operational reality in, roughly, 1960. (Interestingly enough, unlike the definition purported to be in the proposed INF treaty today, an intermediate-range nuclear missile was defined then as one with a range of 1500 nautical miles.)

Since the proliferation began in the early 1960s in both the Soviet Union and the United States of virtually world-range ICBM delivery systems for nuclear warheads, most people have presumed a nuclear attack-counterattack would result in world-wide holocaust. (Except, according to James McCrery, director of strategic programs research and development for the Defense Intelligence Agency, nothing in the Soviet military build-up indicates Kremlin planners ever have agreed with that thesis.)

In 1947, that was not the case, an indication itself that Pentagon strategy for deterring nuclear conflict has changed significantly and now, 40 years later, may change dramatically if the proposed SDI is approved for operational development. In the beginning, the scenario for nuclear war was comparatively uncomplicated, or rather seemed to be. For about a decade after the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, the United States had an operational monopoly on the combination of nuclear warheads and the operational means, long-range bombers, to deliver them on strategic targets. Just as importantly in the long term, the sight of the devastation wrought on the defenseless civilian population in Hiroshima and Nagasaki has colored civilian thinking about military nuclear-war strategy ever since.

During the White House/Pentagon nuclear-monopoly era, deterrent strategy consisted of discouraging conventional-war types of military aggression through such preventive measures as mutual defense treaties, conventionally armed American forces stationed permaently on foreign soil, and foreign military-economic aid – with a mostly implied promise to the Soviets and their surrogates (which at the time included communist China) that, if these arrangements failed to prevent war in the first place, the United States was prepared to exercise its nuclear option.

The limited effectiveness of the nuclear threat became evident almost immediately after it was first made. In 1948, attempting to force the United States and its Allies out of West Berlin, the Soviets threw a blockade around the city. One

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Pentagon response, with initially somewhat reluctant agreement from Great Britain and West Germany, was to deploy B-29 "atomic" bombers to England and upgrade from wing to group size the number of B-29s already deployed in Germany.

Whether those bombers would have been sufficient to stop a Russian juggernaut, which massively outnumbered NATO forces on the ground, is a moot question. What is known is that the bombers' potential threat to Moscow had no apparent impact on the pressure the Kremlin had imposed in Berlin. The blockade persisted into the Spring of 1949 and was lifted only when the now-famous Berlin Airlift had demonstrated clearly it could supply all the city's needs for as long as necessary. (4)

Similarly, the United States' atomic monopoly neither prevented nor ended the Korean war, which began one year after the Berlin blockade ended — though an unsubstantiated story persists that the Chinese agreed to a Korean cease-fire shortly after they learned, through "intelligence sources," that Dwight Eisenhower — the "first general they've elected to the White House in this century — is talking to the Joint Chiefs about dropping atomic bombs on China." The implied point of Berlin and Korea is that it would take a very great deal of provocation before the United States would unleash its atomic bombs.

Nor did the possession of nuclear weapons play any particular role in the missile crisis and United States blockade of Cuba in 1962. Sums up Eliot Cohen, a political scientist on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College, "One of the reasons we came as close to nuclear war as we did — how close is still debatable — is that 1962 was one of the last times each side (Soviet Union and United States) could reasonably consider launching a first strike with some chance of success.

"The U.S. especially; we had clear nuclear superiority — despite all the (President Kennedy) campaign talk (in 1960) about 'missile gaps' — and both sides knew it. But this also was before the great strategic buildups on both sides took effect; we didn't have all that many weapons, and the Soviets could have launched (against those weapons) too." (5)

Cohen also points out — an opinion possibly very relevant to the proposed INF treaty today — that "Conventional balance also made a difference" in 1962. "In the Caribbean, our superiority was overwhelming, of course. But then-Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had been gutting Soviet conventional forces for years to pay for his strategic buildup and economic reforms,

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while our European forces were in excellent shape. Plus we had the draft then and a full reserve."(6)

Meanwhile, for roughly 15 years preceeding the Cuban missile blockade, the Soviets had been pushing themselves to develop both nuclear warheads and delivery systems equivalent, if not superior, to those in the United States. As early as March, 1947, according to G. A. Tokaty, a Soviet Air Force colonel who fled to the West in 1948, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had ordered development of "transatlantic rockets," and in 1949 the Soviets had detonated an atomic device.(7)

Not until 1954, when the size of the Soviet program had been confirmed in considerable detail and technology advance had made the wedding of an ICBM to a relatively small hydrogen warhead of hugely destructive power possible, did Eisenhower order the Pentagon to give top priority to ICBM development. (During those same Eisenhower years, the Soviets vetoed the United States proposals for "Atoms for Peace," i.e. nations turning over to United Nations control all existing atomic weapons and the engineering know-how for their production.)

Then, in 1957, the Soviets launched into orbit the first man-made satellite on October 4, followed one month later by the successful launch of a second *Sputnik*, as they called it, carrying a dog named Laika. Since more rocket-engine thrust is necessary to orbit a payload than to fire a nuclear warhead on a suborbital trajectory, those *Sputnik* achievements confirmed, basically, a Soviet announcement in August that it had successfully flight-tested an ICBM.

The Pentagon reaction was surprise that Soviet ICBM development had been able to move faster than military intelligence sources had forecast, but no concern at all about a lack of ability to answer the Soviet in kind. (In September, 1956, a test rocket launched by the Army had demonstrated clearly it was capable of orbiting a satellite; but a White House policy to keep Space programs separate from ICBM ones, set in 1955, was so rigid the Army had had to certify in writing that the payload would not actually go into orbit before the Pentagon would approve the launch.)(8)

In spite of that confidence, Pentagon and White House attempts to calm Congress, journalists, and the general public had little effect. *Sputnik* was perceived at the political level and by NATO country populations as representing a dire military threat to their safety. Stated in somewhat over-simplified

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terms, the stage had been set for a major shift in Western nuclear-war deterrence strategy.

When *Sputnik* said, in effect, that the Kremlin was building a nuclear-war capability of its own, the rules of the game changed. Until then, as noted above, the accepted Pentagon strategy for possible use of nuclear weapons was comparatively simple: If the United States and/or its allies' forces failed to repulse an attack by numerically superior Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces, United States nuclear-armed bombers would be launched at the Soviet military industrial infrastructure, military bases, submarine pens, deployed armies, fuel supplies, etc., pretty much like the kinds of military targets singled out for strategic bombing raids during World War II.

Notwithstanding the mass killing of defenseless civilians during World War II bombing raids, the prime strategic emphasis of World War II bombing had been to destory the ability of the Axis to support its war machine in the field. During the roughly 1945-1960 period when the United States/NATO held a virtual monopoly on nuclear-weapon delivery stystems, those remained the same conceptual targets of White House/Pentagon strategy if the use of such weapons could not be avoided.

Now that the Soviets also had nuclear delivery systems, what had been the Pentagon promise for 15 years of *unilateral* "Assured Destruction" became, simply put, in the first years of Robert S. McNamara's reign as Secretary of Defense under President John F. Kennedy, "*Mutually* Assured Destruction." (The "MAD" acronym, as in "insane," would be used 25 years later by advocates of SDI to denigrate the war plans and targets which are a necessary fall-out of the MAD strategy.)

McNamara summed up accepted Pentagon strategic thinking in the early part of his service: given Soviet possession of nuclear-delivery ICBM's, "We came to the conclusion that thermonuclear war was unfeasible. Not impossible, in the sense that, technically, it couldn't happen. In that sense, it was all too possible. But unfeasible in the sense that you couldn't fight such a war and hope to win in any meaningful sense . . . strategic (nuclear) forces . . . were not even a deterrent for more than a limited number of actions, because an enemy knew perfectly well that you wouldn't dare use them, and risk destruction of your own society."(9)

Bluntly, from a military perspective the primary targets had been changed. Under the Assured Destruction plan, the

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primary nuclear targets had been the Soviet military infrastructure; under the MAD thesis, the primary, and last-resort, targets became the Soviet population centers. Said McNamara in 1965, ". . . it seems reasonable to assume that the destruction of, say, one-quarter to one-third of (the Soviet) population and about two-thirds of its industrial capacity would mean the elimination of the aggressor as a major power for many years to come."(10)

Yet, in 1968, suggesting that what constitutes "assured deterrence" promises is a highly subjective matter to both the Pentagon and the Kremlin, McNamara said, ". . . I would judge that a capability on our part to destroy, say, one-fifth to one-fourth of (the Russian) population and one-half of her industrial capacity would serve as an effective deterrent . . . would certainly represent intolerable punishment to any 20th Century nation."(11)

From the perspective of military strategists, the central message of what was labelled, in 1964, "the McNamara Strategy," was that (a) a presumed Soviet nuclear first strike would destroy United States nuclear capability to counterattack effectively against Soviet military forces; and therefore, (b) the United States' delivery systems which "assuredly" would survive a Soviet first strike would be launched against Russian population centers.(12)

Relevant to that plan – a nuclear sword the Pentagon still carries today – a few pertinent points should be mentioned:

* McNamara was considered the most outstanding of the Kennedy Administration's Cabinet-level appointees and his views thus carried a considerable influence in White House deliberations on almost any military issue;

* Both Kennedy and, especially, McNamara had a reportedly low regard for the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff generally and those of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations specifically – the heads of the two Services which, heretofore, had had, and continued to have in theory, central roles-and-missions responsibility for preventing and/or conducting, if necessary, nuclear warfare;(13)

* A small group called the Air Force Long Range Plans office in the Pentagon had presented a proposal for military adjustment to the fact that the United States/NATO no longer enjoyed a nuclear monopoly – and McNamara's

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civilian "program analysts," as they were called, said the new weapon systems development proposals of the Air Force planners were not cost-effective, which, given McNamara's "city busting" strategy, they were not;

* A policy decision had been reached at the White House level, one which remained in force until Ronald Reagan was elected United States President, which said essentially that, since neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could win a nuclear war, the only reasonable option was to negotiate treaties with the Kremlin which would allow both sides to reduce their presumably "defenseive" expenditures on nuclear arms.

(It probably should be noted here, for proper context, that McNamara is cited as principal spokesman in the 1960s for the MAD strategic nuclear-war deterrence concept but he was not the only spokesman. Among the many other notable proponents of the concept was Army General Maxwell Taylor, whom Kennedy had brought out of retirement to be, first, Kennedy's principal military advisor and shortly thereafter, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What caused the linkage in the first place was Kennedy's admiration for Taylor's book, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, published in 1959 by Harper and Brothers of New York, in which Taylor argued for a "Strategy of Flexible Response." His contention, briefly summarized: the Air Force had an excess of bombers and insufficient ICBMs for the "strategic retaliatory mission" against the Soviet military-industrial base, and that the Army should be "the principal spokesman for increasing the United States capability in limited war.")

Given the McNamara premise, the probability of such treaty agreements being reached seemed to him to be high. "Any two sensible people," he said, "given the same set of facts (in this case, the mutual ability to destroy each other), usually will come to the same conclusion."(14) The "facts" McNamara saw were that the Soviets had approximately 270 cities with populations of 100,000 or more, about one-third more such clusters than exist in the United States; that, even in a "worst case" analysis, enough United States nuclear delivery systems would survive a pre-emptive Soviet first strike to assure the destruction of at least half those cities; and that, therefore, the production and deployment of any additional strategic nuclear arms, by either side, would be a mere waste of resources.

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As a result, at least on the military side, Pentagon leadership shelved plans for the Air Force to develop an effective counterforce to the new Soviet military threat. Instead, sums up John Collins, top military historian at the Library of Congress, America's nuclear strategy, from the early 1960s on, depended predominately on a "balance of terror."

"The reason," he says, "was elemental. Nothing we could do within the confines of second-strike concepts (the *de facto* presumption in that phrase being, of course, that the Soviets always would be allowed to shoot first under any circumstance) and existing states of technological art (as perceived by political leadership from 1960-1980) could protect the American people or production base against a full-scale missile attack . . . If war occurred, it would cripple both countries, in the absence of missile defense."

Thus, Collins summarizes, "(United States) war-fighting measures were reduced. U.S. leaders remolded massive retaliation, fashioned in the 1950s to fulfill miltiple functions, and focused it on city targets, designed (said McNamara) "to ensure the destruction, singly or in combination, of the Soviet Union, communist China and the communist satellites." Counterforce actions were recast. Their paramount purpose under the new concept was to suppress the foe's defenses, so our Strategic Air Command (SAC) could smash urban centers.

"Peacetime parity replaced superiority as the U.S. force-structure standard, in obeisance to beliefs that relative strengths were meaningless, beyond a finite point . . . Arms control, which previously played a peripheral role, became an inseparable part of U.S. strategy, under direct supervision of the State Department, not the Department of Defense."(15)

A series of treaties were negotiated in an attempt, as the State Department interpreted them, to stabilize what the Soviets call the "correlation of forces" – both a Washington-to-Moscow "hot line" (which is now obsolete technologically) and a Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963; treaties in 1967 to forbid the deployment of mass-destruction weapons in outer Space and prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America; SALT I in 1972 with an ABM-prohibition protocol added in 1974 – these last having had no noticeable effect on either the pace or the content of the continuing Soviet expansion of both its offensive and its defensive nuclear-capable forces.

Indeed, notes Collins, a now-large body of evidence that has

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been accumulating since the era of "MAD" began argues, "Our concept of parity has no discernible counterpart in Soviet strategic thought. 'Too much' from our standpoint rarely seems enough to satisfy Soviet standards of sufficiency. Defense Secretary McNamara clearly missed the mark by a wide margin with his optimistic statement in April, 1965, 'The Soviets have decided that they have lost the quantitative (nuclear) arms race, and they are not seeking to engage us in that contest . . . There is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to develop a strategic nuclear force as large as our own.'"(16)

Added James McCrery of the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1987, "The Soviets never accepted the mutual vulnerability thesis. The idea of allowing themselves to be held hostage to an adversary's nuclear weapons is total anathema to them, totally inconsistent with Soviet thinking – which basically is offense, not defense, oriented . . . (The Soviet) goal is to achieve what they call technical military superiority over the West – in defensive as well as offensive military systems. Their goal is to have the ability to seize the initiative at the outset and hold it throughout any level of military conflict – including a potentially long-term nuclear one – and achieve (military) victory."(17)

The huge Soviet conventional and strategic nuclear machine has one advantage, in a management sense, over Western democracies: it is fed and led by a single, centralized power base, the communist dictatorship in the Kremlin. While that decision-making apparatus has been a failure at expanding the Soviet economy, let alone improving the quality of life of that nation's people, the same rigid bureaucracy has produced a consistent, fully funded military build-up still directed today toward goals established at least as early as when Khrushchev was Soviet Premier, military programs continued by all his successors without any significant change in strategic direction.

A small Defense Council at the highest Kremlin politico-military level sets military policy, approves military programs, allocates resources, assigns weapon-system developments and production, operational combat-unit roles and missions – all those decisions which, in the United States, sometimes get done at the individual service level, sometimes at the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and/or the Joint Chiefs, sometimes at the White House level and sometimes by the Congress. Soviet military programs don't shift direction after

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each national election nor are they shaken particularly by a majority opinion, if there is one, of the Soviet people.

"Some argue," says McCrery, "whether one guy or another (in the Kremlin) agrees with all this Communist doctrine about eventual Communist world supremacy; but the fact remains, when it comes down to the corporate decisions they've made over the past 25-30 years, they've been made on this basis: having the forces capable of fighting and winning."(18)

Looking at these concepts "with a Soviet hat on" has been difficult for U.S. governmental policy makers, he thinks. "Americans like to put things in pigeon holes, e.g. 'conventional forces,' 'offensive nuclear,' 'SDI,' etc. The Soviets see them collectively as a strategic posture, a 'posture' that includes offensive forces, defense forces, their approach to arms control negotiations — all are part of one entity: to eliminate and/or nullify United States nuclear and other warfighting capability and dominate the post-war world militarily."(19)

Political realities argue that neither the United States alone, nor even the U.S. in concert with its NATO allies, could match Soviet military spending as a percentage of total governmental spending. But even as the McNamara/Taylor strategy of flexible response was established, Kennedy worried that his only options, if the United States/NATO were attacked, would be "between atomic holocaust and surrender," and he told a cheering audience in West Berlin in the summer of 1963, "The choice of peace or war is largely Moscow's, not ours."(20)

Newly elected President Richard M. Nixon raised the same question in 1969: Should the President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of slaughtering Soviet civilians, knowing that millions of Americans would be killed in return?(21) However, the only really substantive change in the Nixon Administration was to reduce McNamara's "two-and-a-half wars" Flexible Response concept (i.e. the ability to fight two conventional Korean-sized conflicts at the same time plus a "brushfire" confrontation somewhere else) down to a one-and-one-half capability (which wasn't much of a change since the United States was already snarled in a good-sized war in Vietnam.)

The belief was, as it had been in the 1960s, that such a force structure, in concert with NATO and other allies, should be sufficient deterrence to prevent conventional communist military aggression which otherwise could escalate to, first, a

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tactical nuclear exchange and then, as one side or the other "lost" the first exchange to a strategic nuclear conflict – an escalation that had to be carefully avoided.

Nixon's then-Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, called the "new," which really wasn't so new at all, Pentagon package "realistic deterrence" and a "total force concept," one implication being, of course, a hope that the United States would be able to reduce its conventional force commitment to the defense of NATO/Europe.(22) In his final budget request of Congress, in 1972, Laird spoke optimistically about the likely success of the Army's *Safeguard*(23) system and praised the Nixon Administration for having moved the Nation "from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation" and "from arms competition towards arms limitation."(24)

By then, the policy objective in strategic offensive nuclear weapons vis-a-vis the Soviets was, for the Pentagon, maintenance of "parity" – or, as it came to be called in the late 1970s, "rough equivalence." At least a decade earlier, then-Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay – the man who, before that, had built the Strategic Air Command into the power it was – had begun to contest the "MAD" strategy, arguing that the rate of Russian build-up in ICBMs had put it ahead of the United States in nuclear arms.

He believed that situation to be intolerable and called for America to regain the lead. "Once the counter to a new weapon system has been invented and put into use," he wrote in the mid-1960s, "then, of course, the cycle repeats itself. And new offensive or defensive systems must be developed. You can call this an arms race, but it is the same kind of arms race mankind has been running since the dawn of time."

And it was a race LeMay said the United States/NATO must win against Russia. "Deterrence," he said, "is best achieved through a real and convincing ability to win, not just to punish." He called, in that strategic context, for an advanced manned strategic aircraft (AMSA) to replace the already aging B-52 bombers, an ABM system, improved air defense against bombers, a "vigorous" civil defense program, and the development of "new strategic options . . . through research and development," suggesting deployment of military assets in outer space.(25)

Most of the program LeMay urged can be found, in turn, in an analysis completed and released by the Air Force Long

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Range Plans office in the Pentagon in 1960. Among that study's basic points:

* The objective of our military force must be to defeat the opposing military force. The only way to defeat that military force is to attack it. Destruction of the enemy's industrial base, urban areas and people can neither win nor lose a war. The outcome will be decided as soon as one strategic offensive force dominates the other.

* Whether or not we prepare to bomb cities is a question of policy, not of (military) strength. Cities are the easiest target of all, especially in a nuclear era. A capability to destroy people and cities is an inherent part of any modern military force designed to defeat the opposing military force.

* Strategic offensive forces today are composed of aircraft and missiles. In a few years, they will include Earth satellites. Further into the future, they will include true spacecraft. Strategic offensive (nuclear) forces are the dominant element of military force. This fact is inescapable because all elements of military power are susceptible to destruction by strategic forces today.

Once an enemy's strategic offensive force is defeated, our force can then turn to destruction of the enemy's remaining military capability. The enemy would have no means left to prevent it.

* Noting that "no strategic deadlock in history has endured," the study added, "It is the concensus within the Pentagon that even the defensive (ABM as technology could envision it at the time) system will be unable to cope with future operations of offensive ballistic missiles capable of launching decoys, carrying electronic-countermeasures (to detection and tracking) and altering course during the terminal phase of flight" – or as several Defense Secretaries in the 1960-1980 time frame pointed out, simply be overwhelmed by a multiple-warhead attack.

Thus, said the study, recognizing that an attacking ICBM's capability is limited to hitting fixed targets, "the principal hope for protecting a (United States retaliatory) military force lies in mobility," e.g. missile-carrying submarines under way at sea, ICBMs on mobile truck and railroad launch "pads" (a course the Soviets already have taken), bombers with a fast take-off capability from short runways being dispersed to a

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variety of airfields. The latter, the study said, were essential to the "game plan" because, given do-able technology in that timeframe, only bombers could seek out and destroy an aggressor's counterpart mobile strategic offensive forces.(26)

That Air Force view of strategy, shared to a large extent by Navy leadership in the Pentagon, was markedly different from the McNamara/Taylor "city-attack" view of nuclear war. In spite of the difference, "counterforce advocates," as they called themselves in the military, were partially successful, selling their proposed programs in those 20 years, 1960-1980. That was remarkable given that sharp McNamara-LeMay differences on global strategy inevitably would result in differences about what kind of weapon systems should be developed, produced and deployed to implement strategy.(27)

In cooperation with the Canadians and British, a BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System) began operation in 1961, its development having started even before the Soviets launched their *Sputniks* in 1957. From radars in Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; and Frylingdales Moor, England, three huge detection "fans" spread out northward for 3,000 miles. Their hardware/software elements have been updated technologically from time to time ever since; and they have been supplemented by several other detection systems over the past 20 years, most satellite-driven. Each member of this complementary collection has blind spots but the overall net effect is to lessen the chance of surprise Soviet attacks and false alarms.

Research on a broad range of ABM technologies continued through the 1970s; but primarily to avoid being "surprised" by a Soviet breakthrough in that field rather than as a reflection of a change in nuclear-deterrence strategy. Indeed, deployment of any of the results was forbidden, according to the theory of "mutual assured destruction," because such a deployment could upset the "balance of terror."

Technology research was allowed to continue on a theoretical replacement of the B-52 bomber but production approval came only after the Reagan Administration took office — while the Soviets now reportedly are developing a bomber larger in payload capacity and faster in speed than the B-1, as "AMSA" is now called. In keeping with a standard military philosophy that, if you develop a new offense, you had best develop a defense against it as well, the Navy and its industrial complex generally are considered to have a strong edge in anti-submarine

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warfare and in defense of the fleet against incoming tactical missiles and aircraft. Air-, ground-, and sea-launched cruise missiles have been developed as alternates to ICBMs for attacking fixed Soviet military installations — though the Soviets reportedly have that capability as well, even if it is not as technologically sophisticated.

But the B-70 and B-58 bomber programs were cancelled as was the Dynasaur, a "true aerospace plane" — the latter now surfacing 20 years later as a Soviet program currently under operational test and demonstration. The Skylab Space platform never went beyond an initial display of its potential military utility — while the Soviets are in the advanced stages of constructing a large, permanently obiting Space station manned by military cosmonauts. A 1960s Air Force proposal to build a family of ICBMs, nominally called Midgetman, Mightyman, and Superman, to complement the Minuteman in payload and tactical flexibility went nowhere (though Midgetman's worth is again being debated today in Congress) while the Soviets have, and are today, continually upgrading and adding to their ICBM family in both sizes and variety.

And in conventional forces, of course, the Soviet/Warsaw Pact arsenal, benefitting as it does from shorter and generally more secure lines of communication in the process, is giant-sized compared to the NATO/United States inventory, e.g. more than twice as many main battle tanks, 2,000 more fighter aircraft, half again as many antitank guided weapons, nearly twice as much in mortars and artillery, twice the number of attack helicopters, nearly double the number of armored personnel carriers, a Pacific fleet, alone, as large as the entire United States Navy. Though the technological quality in each case is arguable, as many military experts have noted, "with number differentials like those, quantity takes on a quality of its own."(28)

Sums up now-retired Air Force Brigadier General Robert Richardson (who participated in the aforementioned 1960 Air Force Long Range Plans study), "If we can't change the numbers," and the conventional political wisdom in the United States/NATO is that changing those numbers would be politically and economically impossible, "let's change the game. Let's play football for a while instead of baseball."(29)

He means, simply put, as did President Reagan when he announced the start of it, the Strategic Defense Initiative.

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Opponents of SDI in Congress and elsewhere want to kill the notion off altogether or at least starve it to death for lack of funds — though the Sovets have been working on their own SDI (laser technologies and deployment already of an operational "satellite killer" capable of blacking out all Western space-based communications, for instance), for longer than the United States.

One reason for SDI opposition is the old argument about "destabilizing" the "balance of terror." Another objection is that "it won't work and it will cost too much," a complaint which also has some historical roots. (The same argument was raised against the NASA Man-in-Space program when that was first announced nearly 30 years ago.)

The technological feasibility of SDI may be closer to demonstration than is generally recognized. The *Safeguard* final line of point-defense is a technology that's been in the bank for 15 years now, approximately. And another element in the envisioned layers of "screens" to intercept Soviet ICBMs at every step in their trajectory from launch to atmospheric re-entry was demonstrated about a year ago when a ground-based, non-nuclear, totally defense ERIS (exoatmospheric re-entry vehicle interceptor subsystem) shattered a missile more than 1,000 miles away, before it could re-enter the Earth's atmosphere — and significantly ERIS was launched from a mobile platform.

Claims a retired Army Major General, Henry Mohr, "Defense against deliberate or accidental missile attack is currently possible. Technical and scientific problems (are being) solved. We have reached the point where remaining obstacles to an operational defense (SDI) are essentially political."(30) The SDI program office in the Pentagon said essentially the same thing in early 1987.(31)

Both the Soviet Union and the United States already have airborne and satellite systems for tracking mobile strategic forces, tactical aircraft and missiles; so refining those systems does not appear to be a technologically impossible problem. And what possibly could turn out to be one of the most significant "plusses" politically for SDI is the growing constituency for the program, both in the United States and Europe, through the contracting process for SDI high-technology development work.

Advocates of SDI in the strategic planning business say

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critics miss the point when they insist that, unless SDI is a perfect, impenetrable shield – which the history of warfare suggests SDI probably cannot become – then it will be a failure. In part, that is a reflection again of the old "city-busting" argument, i.e. if even one nuclear warhead slips through an SDI screen, it still will be enough to destroy a city.

The answer of the counterforce advocates is, of course, that the SDI screen doesn't have to be perfect or anywhere close to that level of competence. All SDI has to be able to do to help assure the continuation of nuclear-war deterrence, say SDI advocates, is demonstrate that – in concert with the inherent defenses of dispersal and mobility contained in the United States-British-French strategic offensive forces, themselves – it could "quite probably" assure the survival of enough of those retaliatory strategic forces to destroy their remaining Soviet counterparts.

That, reads the theory, should discourage decisively Soviet plans to launch a pre-emptive first strike. In short, say its advocates, SDI could "change the game." However that currently heated debate is resolved, it seems clear in the nuclear war business that technological advance and Soviet programs have brought the Pentagon to what may be its most significant crossroads since the Soviets launched *Sputnik* in 1957. Ironically, the best advice on what the United States/NATO political leadership ought to do about SDI may have come from Robert S. McNamara, who opposes it, in 1963. Said he then, "A 'No' decision is a decision, a decision to maintain the status quo. And that almost always is a wrong decision."(32)

FOOTNOTES

(1) Statement to the author in 1985.
(2) Statement to the author in 1986.
(3) Statement to the author in 1964.
(4) *The Forrestal Diaries*, edited by Walter Millis, The Viking Press, 1951, pp. 451-454.
(5) Quoted in an article, "Triumph of Uncertain Proportions," *Insight* magazine, Washington, D.C., October 26, 1987, p. 34.
(6) Ibid.
(7) G. A. Tokaty, in *The History of Rocket Technology*, Wayne University Press, 1964, pp. 280-281.

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(8) From an unpublished manuscript, *Preliminary History of NASA: 1963-1969*, on file at the Lyndon Johnson Library in Texas, pp. I-5 to I-7.

(9) Moss, Norman, *Men Who Play God*, Gollancz, London, 1968, p. 271.

(10) Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1966-70 Defense Program and 1966 Defense Budget, February 18, 1975, available from the Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 39.

(11) McNamara statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 50.

(12) William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy*, Harper & Row, New York, 1964, pp. 281-284. Interestingly enough, McNamara had told the House Armed Services Committee, in 1963, that a Soviet-U.S./NATO nuclear exchange probably would result in 190 million fatalities in the United States/Western Europe "and the fatalities in the Soviet Union would approach 100 million" – a statement made less than a year after Macmillan had published a book by then-*Washington Star* newspaper reporter Richard Fryklund titled *100 Million Lives: Maximum Survival in a Nuclear War* (which argued against McNamara's "city-busting" strategy).

(13) Interestingly, that observation can be found both in books which praise the Kennedy/McNamara performance in office and those that criticize that. For two of the former, see Theodore Sorensen, *The Kennedy Legacy*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1969, pp. 87-90; and Patrick Anderson, *The President's Men*, Doubleday & Company, New York, 1968, pp. 269-295. For two of the latter, see Sharp, Admiral U.S.N., *Strategy for Defeat,* Presidio Press, 1979, pp. 120-122, and Coffey, Thomas, *Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General Curtis LeMay*, Crown Publishers, Inc., New York, 1986, pp. 330-372 – and a brief philosophical view of both sides of the argument from Cohen, *Insight* magazine, op. cit.

(14) Statement to the author in 1964.

(15) Collins, John M., *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980*, McGraw-Hill Publications Co., 1980, pp. 122-124.

(16) Quoted in Collins, op. cit., p. 119.

(17) Quoted in an article, "SDI: What the Soviets are Doing and Why," in January, 1987, *Government Executive* magazine, Washington, D.C., p. 15.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Recorded in a phonograph album, "The Kennedy Years: 1956: 1963," by the Longines Symphonette Recording Society, 1964, Record 1, side 2.

(21) Nixon, Richard M., "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1970, p. 122.

(22) Laird, Melvin R., "National Security Strategy for Realistic Deterrence," statement to Congress on the Defense Department's budget request for Fiscal Year 1973, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., February, 1972, pp. 21-22, 36.

(23) *Safeguard*, an ABM point-defense against incoming nuclear warheads had proved technology was sufficiently advanced so that a "speeding bullet" could indeed shoot down an incoming "speeding bullet" but the only *Safeguard* system ever deployed (next to an ICBM complex in North Dakota) was largely dismantled in 1974-75.

(23) Laird, op. cit., p. 1.

(24) Coffey, op. cit., pp. 370-371.

(26) For a full description of the scenario, see Frykland, *100 Million Lives*, op. cit., and/or *Armed Forces Management* magazine, Washington, D.C., a three-part series in March, April and May, 1960, titled "Today's Military Strategy: Is it National Suicide?" Though both works carry a journalist's by-line, more than 90% of the content was provided by Air Force officers in Long Range Plans who, for in-house reasons of their own, wanted public anonymity.

(27) Coffey, op. cit., p. 372.

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(28) Retired Navy Vice Admiral John T. Hayward (who commanded the U.S. naval forces during the Cuban missile blockade) to the author in 1985; Mack F. Mattingly, a former Senator from Georgia and a new senior NATO official on armaments procurement, in *Government Executive* magazine, October, 1987, issue, p. 71.

(29) Statement to the author in 1986.

(30) Mohr, *The Washington Times*, October 23, 1987, p. E3.

(31) Abrahamson, Gen. James, "Strategic Defense Initiatives: Why the Critics' Attitude is Obsolete," *Government Executive* magazine, January, 1987, pp. 12-14.

(32) Statement to the author, 1963.

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